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Abstract	
We	show	that	professional	management	began	to	emerge	in	UK	companies	during	the	first	
half	of	the	twentieth	century,	a	development	which	was	widely	theorised	and	accepted.	
However,	the	managerially-led	enterprise	was	accommodated	rather	than	protected	by	
company	law,	making	it	vulnerable	to	changes	in	the	law.	The	Cohen	Report	of	1945	paid	no	
attention	to	these	developments,	and	led	to	the	introduction,	in	the	Companies	Act	1948,	of	
important,	but	previously	little	appreciated,	changes	in	the	name	of	enhancing	the	
accountability	of	directors	to	shareholders.	The	shareholders’	statutory	right	to	remove	the	
directors	by	simple	majority	overturned	existing	structures	overnight	and	was	an	important	
driver	of	the	hostile	takeover,	which	emerged	shortly	afterwards.	This	deprived	
management	of	the	necessary	autonomy	to	balance	the	competing	interests	at	stake	in	the	
enterprise	and	to	foster	innovation.	This	is	how	the	current	system	of	shareholder	primacy	
was	born.		
Key	Words	
Company	Law,	Corporate	Governance,	Enterprise,	Management,	Hostile	Takeover,	Legal	
History	
																																								 																				
*	We	are	grateful	to	the	following	for	helpful	discussions	on	this	topic:	Christopher	Bruner,	Robert	
Burrell,	Brian	Cheffins,	Simon	Deakin,	Ewan	McGaughey,	Jo	Maltby,	David	Millon,	Marc	Moore,	John	
Quail,	Navajyoti	Samanta,	Jeroen	Veldman,	participants	in	a	3CL	seminar	at	the	University	of	
Cambridge	and	in	a	Management	and	Organisational	History	Seminar	at	the	University	of	York,	
delegates	at	a	SMART	conference	at	the	University	of	Oslo	on	‘Sustainable	Business	Models’,	and	the	
anonymous	referees.	All	errors	remain	our	own.	
2	
	
	
FROM	BALANCED	ENTERPRISE	TO	HOSTILE	TAKEOVER:	HOW	THE	LAW	FORGOT	
ABOUT	MANAGEMENT*	
	
1.	INTRODUCTION	
‘Here	is	the	most	urgent	challenge	to	political	invention	ever	offered	to	the	jurist	and	
the	statesman.	The	human	association	which	in	fact	produces	and	distributes	wealth,	
the	 association	 of	 workmen,	 managers,	 technicians	 and	 directors,	 is	 not	 an	
association	recognised	by	the	law.	The	association	which	the	law	does	recognise	–	the	
association	of	 shareholders,	creditors	and	directors	–	 is	 incapable	of	production	or	
distribution	and	is	not	expected	by	the	law	to	perform	these	functions.	We	have	to	
give	 law	 to	 the	 real	 association	 and	 to	 withdraw	 meaningless	 privilege	 from	 the	
imaginary	one.’1	
In	 this	 article	we	 offer	 a	 new	 account	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 Companies	 Act	 1948	 for	
corporate	governance	 in	the	UK,	 focusing	on	 its	effects	on	the	autonomy	that	professional	
managers	had	gained	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	and	claimed	to	be	using	
to	balance	the	competing	claims	of	the	various	contributors	to	the	corporate	enterprise.	This	
autonomy	was	 accommodated	but	 not	 explicitly	 protected	by	 the	 law.	We	argue	 that	 the	
introduction	of	a	mandatory	power	for	shareholders	to	remove	directors	by	simple	majority	
in	the	Companies	Act	1948	was	an	important	driver	of	the	emergence	of	the	hostile	takeover,	
which	is	characterised	by	wholesale	replacement	of	directors.	This	allowed	the	shareholder	
primacy	model	of	corporate	governance	to	become	established	and	supersede	the	emergent	
																																								 																				
*	We	are	grateful	to	the	following	for	helpful	discussions	on	this	topic:	Christopher	Bruner,	Robert	
Burrell,	Brian	Cheffins,	Simon	Deakin,	Ewan	McGaughey,	Jo	Maltby,	David	Millon,	Marc	Moore,	John	
Quail,	Navajyoti	Samanta,	Jeroen	Veldman,	participants	in	a	3CL	seminar	at	the	University	of	
Cambridge	and	in	a	Management	and	Organisational	History	Seminar	at	the	University	of	York,	
delegates	at	a	SMART	conference	at	the	University	of	Oslo	on	‘Sustainable	Business	Models’,	and	the	
anonymous	referees.	All	errors	remain	our	own.	
1	Lord	Eustace	Percy,	The	Unknown	State,	16th	Riddell	Memorial	Lectures	(Oxford:	OUP,	1944).	
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managerially-led	enterprise	that	had	evolved	after	1900.		In	doing	so,	we	show	that,	rather	
than	 a	 pure	 market	 outcome,	 shareholder	 control	 over	 companies	 was	 a	 policy	 choice	
imposed	 by	 legislation,	 which	 disrupted	 the	 ‘natural	 development’	 of	 professional	
management	and	the	enterprise.	
The	article	draws	on	a	historically-grounded	account	of	the	function	of	management,	as	well	
as	archival	research	on	the	genesis	of	the	Cohen	Report	that	led	to	the	Companies	Act	1948,	
to	make	two	contributions.	First,	 it	contributes	to	the	theoretical	debate	about	the	role	of	
company	 law	 in	shaping	corporate	governance	outcomes.	We	show	that	 the	1948	reforms	
were	a	 regulatory	 intervention	which	disrupted	 the	pre-1948	governance	arrangements	 in	
which	 directors	 (and,	 below	 them,	 managers)	 were	 strongly	 entrenched	 and	 to	 which	
shareholders	 had	 consented.	 Our	 analysis	 provides	 support	 for	 those	 who	 contend	 that	
company	 law	 ‘plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 constitution	 of	 financial	 property	 forms	 such	 as	
shares…	and	a	more	modest	one	in	seeking	to	ensure	their	continued	integrity.’2	However,	it	
goes	further	and	shows	that	the	law	actually	enhanced	the	value	of	shareholders’	property	
rights	 by	 rewriting	 the	 bargains	 struck	 between	 shareholders	 and	 companies.	 In	 doing	 so,	
company	law	was	operating	in	a	manner	more	akin	to	‘regulatory	paternalism’,	in	which	the	
state	substitutes	its	view	of	a	desirable	corporate	governance	framework	for	the	outcome	of	
‘privately-driven,	market-based	rule	selections’.3	As	such,	it	is	closer	to	the	fears	expressed	by	
contractarians	about	‘politically-motivated	regulatory	interventions	that	will	inevitably	reflect	
the	partisan	preferences	of	dominant	social	interest	groups’.4		
																																								 																				
2	P	Ireland,	‘Property	and	Contract	in	Contemporary	Corporate	Theory’	(2003)	23	Legal	Studies	453,	
501,	emphasis	in	original.	
3	M	Moore,	Corporate	Governance	in	the	Shadow	of	the	State	(Oxford:	Hart,	2013)	p	256.	
4	ibid	at	92;	Easterbrook	and	Fischel	say	that	‘Unless	there	is	a	strong	reason	to	believe	that	regulation	
has	a	comparative	advantage	over	competition	in	markets	in	evaluating	the	effects	of	corporate	
contracts…	there	is	no	basis	for	displacing	actual	arrangements	as	“mistakes”,	“exploitation,”	and	the	
like.’	F	Easterbrook	and	D	Fischel,	The	Economic	Structure	of	Corporate	Law	(Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	
University	Press,	1991)	p	32.	
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Second,	it	contributes	to	the	historical	debate	about	the	causes	and	effects	of	the	emergence	
of	the	hostile	takeover.	Previous	contributions	have	suggested	that	the	1948	Act	facilitated	
this	 by	 furnishing	 bidders	 with	 more	 reliable	 information,	 and	 have	 also	 highlighted	 the	
importance	of	the	emergence	of	institutional	investors	in	the	post-war	period.	We	add	to	this	
debate	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 contribution	 of	 the	 shareholder	 removal	 power	 to	 the	 hostile	
takeover	has	not,	to	date,	been	adequately	explored.	The	new	powers	given	to	shareholders	
made	control	of	many	companies	suddenly	contestable,	as	the	threshold	for	director	removal	
was	reduced	overnight	to	a	simple	majority.	The	effect	was	to	transform	managerial	practices,	
sidelining	the	dominant	managerial	ideology	of	balancing	competing	interests,	and	ultimately	
acting	as	one	of	the	key	drivers	of	the	emergence	of	financialised	corporate	governance	and	
the	social	norm	of	shareholder	primacy.5	Scholars	have	 identified	many	of	the	costs	of	this	
shift,	 such	 as	 its	 impact	 on	 employee	 willingness	 to	 make	 contractually	 unprotected	
investments	 in	 firm-specific	 human	 capital,	 and	 reduced	 investment	 in	 R&D.6 	This	 paper	
suggests	that	these	effects	were,	in	considerable	part,	driven	by	the	legal	changes	of	1948	and	
the	 subsequent	 emergence	 of	 the	 hostile	 takeover,	 which	 disrupted	 the	management-led	
enterprises	that	had	developed	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.		
The	paper	is	structured	as	follows.	In	Part	2,	we	explore	the	historical	emergence	of	modern	
professional	management	 in	the	UK	from	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century.	While	the	UK	
may	have	lagged	behind	the	US	and	Germany	in	this	regard,	we	show	that	this	development	
was	 widely	 accepted,	 and	 was	 legitimated	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 these	 scientific	 managers	
would	seek	to	innovate	and	to	balance	the	competing	interests	at	stake	in	the	enterprise.	In	
part	3,	we	show	that	these	radical	changes	in	the	management	of	companies	occurred	in	an	
unchanged	legal	context	and	that	the	law	never	developed	a	positive	conception	of	the	role	
																																								 																				
5	S	Deakin,	‘The	Coming	Transformation	of	Shareholder	Value’	(2005)	13	Corporate	Governance:	An	
International	Review	11.	
6	M	Blair,	Ownership	and	Control	(Washington,	DC:	Brookings,	1995);	W	Lazonick,	‘Profits	without	
Prosperity’	(2014)	Harvard	Business	Review	46	(September)	
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of	 management.	 Various	 familiar	 features	 of	 company	 law	 allowed	 the	 development	 of	
relatively	autonomous	hierarchies	which	could	operate	in	this	way,	but	the	law	did	not	provide	
positive	support	for	them,	refusing,	for	example,	to	allow	boards	of	directors	to	give	managers	
full	 autonomy.	 The	 dependence	 of	 managers’	 positions	 on	 boards	 of	 directors	 made	
managerial	structures	vulnerable	to	the	later	move	to	empower	shareholders.	In	Part	4,	we	
show	that	the	company	law	reforms	of	1947-8	represent	a	deliberate	regulatory	intervention	
into	 the	 control	of	 companies	which	 sought	 to	put	 shareholders	 in	 control.	 The	 reformers	
ignored	the	emerging	role	of	management	within	the	enterprise	and	focused	exclusively	on	
the	relationship	between	shareowners	and	directors.	We	examine	in	particular	the	origins	of,	
and	rationale	for,	the	shareholders’	new	mandatory	power	to	remove	the	directors	by	simple	
majority.	 Part	 5	 shows	 how	 these	 reforms	 contributed	 to	 creating	 the	 conditions	 for	 the	
emergence	 of	 the	 hostile	 takeover,	 characterised	 by	 the	 removal	 of	 directors	 and	 a	
reorientation	of	managerial	objectives,	from	the	1950s	onwards.	We	conclude	with	a	plea	for	
scholars	to	address	the	role	and	status	of	management	in	law,	which	is	essential	if	post-crisis	
economies	are	to	become	sustainable	and	responsible.		
	
2.	THE	EMERGENCE	OF	PROFESSIONAL	MANAGEMENT	IN	THE	UK	
The	timing	of	the	separation	of	‘ownership’	and	control	in	the	UK	remains	controversial.	The	
conventional	account,	based	on	Chandler,	is	that	family	control	of	companies	persisted	in	the	
UK	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century.7	Hannah	has	challenged	this,	arguing	on	the	
basis	 of	 London	 Stock	 Exchange	 data	 that	 the	 separation	 occurred	 much	 earlier	 in	 listed	
companies,	 so	 that,	 by	 the	early	 twentieth	 century,	 a	 substantial	majority	of	 large	quoted	
																																								 																				
7	AD	Chandler,	Scale	and	Scope:	The	Dynamics	of	Industrial	Capitalism	(Cambridge,	MA:	Belknap	Press,	
1990)	pp	288-9;	B	Cheffins,	‘History	and	the	Global	Corporate	Governance	Revolution:	The	UK	
Perspective’	(2001)	43(4)	Business	History	87,	91;	B	Cheffins,	Corporate	Ownership	and	Control:	British	
Business	Transformed	(Oxford:	OUP,	2008),	Chapter	9.	
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British	 industrials	 had	 widely	 dispersed	 shareholdings,	 but	 with	 the	 directors	 (and	 other	
founders)	owning	up	to	33%	of	the	shares.8		
The	extent	to	which	management	of	UK	companies	was	in	the	hands	of	professionals	in	the	
first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	is	similarly	contested.	Based	on	an	analysis	of	companies	
listed	in	the	UK	in	1911,	Foreman-Peck	and	Hannah	argue	that	the	‘evolution	of	managerial	
control	 in	the	UK	was	substantially	complete	before	1914’	with	directors	holding	office	 ‘by	
virtue	of	their	skills,	knowledge,	and	networks,	and	promotion	or	recruitment	to	the	board,	
not	because	they	held	preponderant	ownership	stakes.’9	Similarly,	Sargant	Florence	reports	
significant	growth	in	the	ratio	of	staff	to	operatives	in	the	UK	between	1924	and	1948,	noting	
that	management	had	become	‘more	specialized	and	more	graded	into	ranks	from	general	
manager	to	foreman	and	charge-hand’.10	Against	this,	Chandler	emphasises	the	persistence	
of	 founder	 control,	 so	 that	 ‘commitment	 to	 personal	ways	 of	management	was	 therefore	
perpetuated’.11	Likewise,	Lazonick	argues	that	‘British	proprietary	capitalists	 left	substantial	
control	over	the	organization	of	production	and	the	acquisition	of	skills	on	the	shop	floor’	and	
did	not	make	‘investments	in	the	technical	specialists	who	are	integrated	into	the	managerial	
structure.’12		
Whilst	UK	companies	did	not	have	had	the	formal	divisional	structure	so	lauded	by	Chandler	
as	 the	 source	of	US	 competitive	advantage,	 it	 is	 clear	 that,	 even	where	 they	were	owner-
dominated,	 British	 companies	 were	 appointing	 technical	 general	 managers	 from	 the	 late	
1800s,	 and	 that	 craft	 workers	 on	 the	 shop	 floor	 were	 not	 doing	 all	 the	 operational	
																																								 																				
8	L	Hannah,	‘The	“Divorce”	of	ownership	from	control	from	1900	onwards:	Re-calibrating	imagined	
global	trends’	(2007)	49	Business	History	404,	417.	See	also	GG	Acheson,	G	Campbell,	JD	Turner,	and	
N	Vanteeva,	‘Corporate	Ownership	and	Control	in	Victorian	Britain.’	(2015)	68	Economic	History	
Review	911.	For	a	critique	of	Hannah’s	account,	see	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	p	197.	
9	J	Foreman-Peck	and	L	Hannah,	‘Extreme	Divorce:	The	Managerial	Revolution	in	UK	Companies	
before	1914’	(2012)	65	Economic	History	Review	1217.			
10	P	Sargant	Florence,	The	Logic	of	British	and	American	Industry	(London:	Routledge,	1953)	p	140.	
11	Chandler	(1990)	above	n	7	p	240	
12	W	Lazonick,	Business	Organization	and	the	Myth	of	the	Market	Economy	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2000),	p	
269.		
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management.	 These	 structures	were	 certainly	more	 ad	 hoc	 than	 those	put	 in	place	by	US	
companies,13	but	to	deny	their	existence	is	surely	wrong.	In	1896,	Slater	Lewis	published	what	
Urwick	and	Brech	describe	as	‘the	first	example	of	a	modern	“organisation	chart”	in	British	
business	 literature’,14	showing	 a	 hierarchy	 from	 shareholders	 to	 directors	 to	 chairman	 or	
managing	director,	with	the	latter	above	a	general	manager.	The	general	manager	sat	at	the	
top	of	 a	 large	hierarchy,	with	 the	works	manager	 and	 chief	 engineer	below	and	 reporting	
directly	to	him.	Urwick	and	Brech	argue	that	by	1916,	‘no	writer	on	industrial	management	
would	 have	 given	 a	 works	 manager	 any	 descriptions	 that	 left	 doubts	 about	 his	 inclusion	
among	the	ranks	of	the	responsible	executives.’15	Even	in	companies	that	still	had	a	dominant	
shareholder	 from	 the	 founding	 family	 who	 controlled	 the	 board,	 there	 was	 considerable	
delegation	to	professional	managers,	and	the	dominant	shareholder	normally	ensured	that	
those	 managers	 had	 the	 resources	 necessary	 to	 make	 the	 investments	 to	 carry	 out	 the	
strategic	plans	developed	by	the	board.16		
This	is	not,	however,	to	claim	that	the	practices	which	emerged	in	the	UK	were	ideal.	Far	from	
it.	The	UK	did	not	train	anywhere	near	as	many	engineers	as	the	US	or	Germany,	and	also	
lagged	 far	 behind	 them	 in	 offering	 university	 training	 in	 management.17	With	 less	 formal	
																																								 																				
13	Webb,	for	example,	referred	to	‘a	hierarchy	culminating	in	some	form	of	General	Manager	or	
Managing	Director,	and	reaching,	in	some	cases,	a	high	degree	of	complexity’:	S	Webb,	The	Works	
Manager	Today	(London:	Longmans,	1918)	pp	4-5.	
14	L	Urwick	and	EFL	Brech,	The	Making	of	Scientific	Management	Volume	II:	Management	in	British	
Industry	(London:	Management	Publications	Trust,	1949)	p	81.	
15	Ibid	p	85.	For	further	examples	of	early	organizational	diagrams,	see	O.	Sheldon,	Philosophy	of	
Management	(London:	Pitman,	1923)	pp	118	and	121.	
16	See	for	example	the	case	studies	contained	in	MJ	Lewis,	R	Lloyd-Jones,	J	Maltby	and	MD	Matthews,	
Personal	Capitalism	and	Corporate	Governance:	British	Manufacturing	in	the	First	Half	of	the	
Twentieth	Century	(Basingstoke:	Ashgate,	2011);	M	Richardson,	‘Rapprochement	and	Retribution:	The	
Divergent	Experiences	of	Workers	in	Two	Large	Paper	and	Print	Companies	in	the	1926	General	Strike’	
in	M	Richardson	and	P	Nicholls	(eds)	A	Business	and	Labour	History	of	Britain:	Case	studies	of	Britain	
in	the	Nineteenth	and	Twentieth	Centuries	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2011)	p	94.		
17	SP	Keeble,	The	Ability	to	Manage:	A	Study	of	British	Management	1890-1990	(Manchester:	
Manchester	University	Press,	1992),	Chapter	Four;	Chandler	(1990)	above	n	7,	p	293;	R	Khurana,	From	
Higher	Aims	to	Hired	Hands:	The	Social	Transformation	of	American	Business	Schools	and	the	
Unfulfilled	Promise	of	Management	as	a	Profession	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2007)	p	
138;	RP	Amdam,	‘Business	Education’	in	G	Jones	and	J	Zeitlin	(eds),	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	Business	
History	(Oxford:	OUP,	2008)	pp	583-5.	
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hierarchy	and	structure,	British	firms	carried	out	less	industrial	research,	tending	to	rely	on	
consulting	 engineers	 rather	 than	 in-house	 staff,	 a	 less	 effective	method	 than	 carrying	 out	
research	 in-house,	which	 combines	 ‘skills	 and	 information	 from	a	wide	 range	 of	 functions	
within	 the	 firm,	 and	 often	 exploits	 firm-specific	 knowledge	 emerging	 from	 the	 production	
process.’18	Accordingly,	 UK	management	 clearly	 lagged	 behind	 their	 counterparts	 in	 other	
jurisdictions	 in	 fostering	 innovation	 through	 research	 and	 innovation	 programmes,19	with	
some	 scholars	 explaining	 this	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 British	 boards	 did	 not	 delegate	 enough	
authority	to	their	managers.20	We	will	see	in	section	3	below	that	the	law	imposed	limitations	
on	the	extent	to	which	directors	could	do	this.	
The	professional	manager	was	a	new	figure	on	the	 industrial	scene,	and	his	role	had	to	be	
explained	and	 legitimated.	This	process	began	 in	 the	UK	around	 the	 turn	of	 the	 twentieth	
century	 in	 the	 management	 literature, 21 	which	 explained	 that	 professional	 managers	
furthered	the	public	good	by	applying	specialised	skills,	following	an	ethics	of	professionalism	
which	 required	 them	 to	 balance	 competing	 interests,	 and	 fostering	 the	 development	 of	
innovative	capabilities.22		
First,	as	regards	specialized	skills,	for	example,	Burton	describes	the	general	manager	as	an	
‘autocrat,	 controlling	 and	 directing	 everyone	 connected	 with	 the	 concern	 excepting	 the	
secretary	 and	 auditor,	 and	 himself	 subject	 only	 to	 his	 directors.’23	He	 ‘should	 be	 a	 highly	
																																								 																				
18	DC	Mowery,	‘Industrial	Research	1900-1950’	in	B	Elbaum	and	W	Lazonick	(eds),	The	Decline	of	the	
British	Economy	(Oxford:	Clarendon,	1986)	pp	194-9.	However,	Sheldon	(1923)	above	n	15,	p	44	
reported	that,	even	in	the	UK,	‘Many	large	firms	have	now	instituted	research	departments,	for	both	
applied	and	pure	research.’		
19	DC	Coleman,	‘Failings	and	Achievements:	Some	British	Businesses,	1910–80’	(1987)	29	Business	
History	1	pp	5-6.	
20	DR	Shiman,	‘Managerial	Inefficiency	and	Technological	Decline	in	Britain,	1860-1914’	(1991)	20	
Business	and	Economic	History	89,	92-4;	J	Quail,	‘The	Proprietorial	Theory	of	the	Firm	and	its	
Consequences’	(2000)	3	Journal	of	Industrial	History	1,	8.	
21	For	an	essential	overview,	see	J	Child,	British	Management	Thought:	A	Critical	Analysis	(London:	
Allen	and	Unwin,	1969),	Chapter	Three.	
22	See	for	example	Sheldon	(1923)	above	n	15,	p	26.	
23	FG	Burton,	The	Commercial	Management	of	Engineering	Works	(Manchester:	Scientific	Publishing	
Co,	1899),	pp	iv	and	20.	
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qualified	engineer’	with	‘a	sufficient	grasp	of	all	the	departments’	using	‘his	general	technical	
knowledge	and	common	sense’	to	‘reconcile	their	conflicting	claims,	and	direct	them	all	to	the	
making	of	a	profitable	revenue	account.’24	
Second,	as	for	the	professionalism	of	these	new	managers,	Webb	described	works	managers	
as	belonging	to	‘a	brain-working	profession…	arranging	and	directing	the	activities	of	a	band	
of	producers,	including	both	brain-workers	and	manual	workers,	as	to	create	among	them	the	
most	 effective	 co-operation	 of	 their	 energies	 in	 achieving	 the	 common	 purpose’.25 	Other	
writers	around	this	time	were	also	linking	professionalization	to	striking	a	workable	balance	
between	the	interests	of	capital	and	labour.	Elbourne	referred	to	‘the	co-ordination	of	labour	
with	capital’	as	 ‘the	outstanding	problem	of	management	 today’	 requiring	 the	manager	 to	
nurture	‘a	spirit	of	goodwill	coupled	with	an	adequate	sense	of	discipline.’26	Similarly,	Taylor	
explained	that	that	‘the	fundamental	interests	of	employés	and	employers…	are	one	and	the	
same’, 27 	an	 idea	 which	 was	 gaining	 currency	 in	 management	 circles	 in	 the	 UK. 28 	These	
emerging	approaches	were	endorsed	by	government,	with	a	1919	Ministry	of	Reconstruction	
publication,	Scientific	Business	Management,	stating	that:	
‘In	 the	 past	 management	 has	 often	 been	 somewhat	 mechanical	 in	 its	 tendency,	
ignoring	the	human	element	in	production	and	distribution.	Today,	more	than	ever,	it	
is	realised	that	the	welfare	of	the	worker	is	not	only	a	vital	matter	for	the	community,	
																																								 																				
24	ibid	at	24.	Armstrong	notes	the	widespread	use	in	Victorian	England	of	salaried	managers	who	
‘were	often	engineers	by	the	standards	of	the	day’:	P	Armstrong,	‘Changing	Management	Control	
Strategies:	The	Role	of	Competition	between	Accountancy	and	other	Organisational	Professions’	
(1985)	10	Accounting,	Organizations	and	Society	129,	138.		
25	Webb	(1918)	above	n	13,	pp	3-4.	For	the	parallel	debate	in	the	US,	see	for	example,	L	Brandeis,	
‘Business	–	A	Profession’	(1912	speech	reprinted	in	Business	–	A	Profession	(Boston:	Small,	Maynard	&	
Co,	1912)).		
26	ET	Elbourne,	The	Management	Problem	(London:	Library	Press,	1919).	
27	FW	Taylor,	The	Principles	of	Scientific	Management	(New	York:	Harper	and	Brothers,	1919)	p	10.	
28	Urwick	and	Brech	(1949)	above	n	14,	pp	99-102.	
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but	also	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	employer	a	matter	of	expediency.	There	is	thus	
the	double	stimulus	–	the	good	employer	profits	by	his	“goodness”.’29		
This	balancing	of	interests	gradually	became	more	widely	accepted	as	a	public	service	ethos	
was	 claimed	 for	 management, 30 	reaching	 its	 zenith	 in	 Tawney’s	 argument	 that	 industry	
‘should	 cease	 to	 be	 conducted	 by	 the	 agents	 of	 property-owners	 for	 the	 advantage	 of	
property-owners,	and	should	be	carried	on,	instead,	for	the	service	of	the	public’.31		
The	final	aspect	of	the	legitimation	of	management	was	that	it	would	develop	the	necessary	
innovative	 capabilities	 for	 the	 enterprise	 to	 be	 successful.	 Whilst	 we	 acknowledge	 that,	
compared	to	their	competitors,	UK	manufacturers	relatively	neglected	science,	Burton	noted	
as	early	at	1899	that	‘It	is	chiefly	in	the	manufacturer’s	appreciation	of	the	scientific	branches	
of	his	establishment,	and	of	research	work	that	the	need	lies’.32	The	emerging	‘science-based’	
industry	was	 transforming	 the	enterprise	 from	a	productive	 to	an	 innovative	organisation,	
driving	organizations	into	the	unknown,	which	demanded	radical	new	competencies	to	devise	
innovative	but	sustainable	strategies.	For	example,	Sheldon	emphasised	the	contribution	of	
the	‘continued	growth	of	inventions	for	both	manual	and	clerical	operations’	in	adding	to	the	
‘complexity	 and	 responsibility	 of	management’.33	Managers	 required	broad	 autonomy	and	
authority	because	they	were	pursuing	innovation	in	a	context	of	‘radical	uncertainty’,	where	
the	 consequences	 of	 decisions	 cannot	 be	 known	 in	 advance,	 making	 collective	 decision-
																																								 																				
29	Ministry	of	Reconstruction,	Scientific	Business	Management,	Reconstruction	Problems	28,	(London:	
HMSO,	1919).	
30	Child	(1969)	above	n	21,	p	46;	for	a	discussion	of	the	parallel	debates	in	the	US,	see	A	Kaufman,	L	
Zacharias	and	M	Karson,	Managers	vs.	Owners:	The	Struggle	for	Corporate	Control	in	American	
Democracy	(Oxford:	OUP,	1995)	pp	114-7;	M	O’Sullivan,	Contests	for	Corporate	Control	(Oxford:	OUP,	
2000)	pp	100-2.	
31	RH	Tawney,	The	Acquisitive	Society	(London:	G	Bell	and	Sons,	1921)	p	111.	See	also	R	Marens,	
‘Recovering	the	past:	reviving	the	legacy	of	the	early	scholars	of	corporate	social	responsibility’	(2008)	
14	Journal	of	Management	History	55.	
32	Burton	(1899)	above	n	23,	p	28.	
33	Sheldon	(1923)	above	n	15,	p	46.	
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making	impossible.	Modern	managerial	authority	thus	derives	from,	and	is	a	response	to,	this	
radical	uncertainty:		
‘Uncertainty	leads	to	the	tendency	of	the	groups	themselves	to	specialize,	finding	the	
individuals	with	the	greatest	managerial	capacity	of	the	requisite	kinds	and	placing	
them	 in	 charge	 of	 the	 work	 of	 the	 group,	 submitting	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 other	
members	to	their	direction	and	control.’34		
Hence,	when	Berle	and	Means	concluded	that	‘the	“control”	of	the	great	corporations’	might	
‘develop	into	a	purely	neutral	technocracy,	balancing	a	variety	of	claims	by	various	groups	in	
the	community’,35	they	were	simply	reflecting	the	previous	forty	years	of	debate	about	the	
role	of	management	in	productive	enterprise.	This	conception	of	management	became	widely	
accepted,	and	as	 late	as	1955,	Gower	commented	that	 ‘it	has	become	almost	an	accepted	
dogma	 that	 management	 owed	 duties	 to	 “the	 four	 parties	 to	 industry”	 (labor,	 capital,	
management,	 and	 the	 community)	 –	 a	 dogma	 which	 is	 repeated	 indiscriminately	 in	 the	
speeches	 of	 right-wing	 company	 chairmen	 and	 left-wing	 politicians.’36	Although	 Quail	 has	
noted	 that	 the	 ‘extent	 to	which	such	 thoughts	 found	expression	 let	alone	 influence	within	
large	UK	businesses	is	unknown’,37	Nichols,	in	interviews	conducted	with	managers	between	
1961-2,	found	evidence	that	this	was	done	implicitly,	with	managers	focusing	on	promoting	
the	success	of	the	company	through	economic	growth,	believing	that	this	would	produce	fair	
outcomes	for	all	contributors,	and	promoting	social	welfare	through	economic	growth,	rather	
																																								 																				
34	F	Knight,	Risk,	Uncertainty,	and	Profit	(Boston:	Houghton	Mifflin,	1921)	at	269.	
35	A	Berle	and	G	Means,	The	Modern	Corporation	and	Private	Property	(Piscataway,	NJ:	Transaction	
Publishers,	1991	edition)	pp	312-3.	
36	LCB	Gower,	‘Corporate	Control:	The	Battle	for	the	Berkeley’	(1955)	68	Harvard	Law	Review	1176,	
1190.	
37	J	Quail,	‘Visible	Hands	and	Visible	Handles:	Understanding	the	Managerial	Revolution	in	the	UK’	
(2002)	5	Journal	of	Industrial	History	1,	5.	
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than	through	an	explicit	focus	on	social	responsibility	in	the	form	of	a	calculus	of	social	costs	
and	benefits.38	
	
3.	THE	ACCOMMODATION	OF	THE	MANAGERIAL	ENTERPRISE	IN	LAW	
These	developments	in	managerial	theory	and	practice	occurred	after	the	establishment	of	
the	legal	framework	governing	the	allocation	of	power	in	companies.	In	this	section,	we	show	
that	 the	 growth	 of	 professional	 management	 was	 accommodated	 within	 existing	 and	
developing	company	law	doctrines	and	practices,	rather	than	positively	supported	by	law.	As	
company	 law	 gave	 considerable	 leeway	 to	 directors	 and	 prevented	 shareholders	 from	
interfering	directly	 in	business	decisions,	boards	were	able	to	shield	professional	managers	
from	shareholder	pressure,	giving	them	sufficient	autonomy	to	balance	competing	interests	
and	to	innovate.	However,	the	law	paid	no	attention	to	management,	recognising	the	position	
of	‘managing	director’,	but	ignoring	managers	below	board	level.	This	meant	that	managerial	
autonomy	was	 never	 guaranteed	 by	 law,	 a	 fragile	 state	 of	 affairs	which	was	 disrupted	 by	
subsequent	 changes	 to	 the	 law	 which	 empowered	 shareholders	 and	 contributed	 to	 the	
emergence	of	the	hostile	takeover	(discussed	in	parts	4	and	5	below).	
	
(a) The	legal	conditions	allowing	the	emergence	of	professional	management	
There	was	adequate	space	within	company	law	at	the	beginning	of	the	twentieth	century	for	
professional	 management	 to	 develop.	 Contemporaneous	 accounts	 indicate	 that	 most	
shareholders	did	not	participate	in	meetings,	did	not	hold	the	directors	and	management	to	
account,	 and	were	 ‘satisfied	by	 conventionally	 adequate	dividends’.39	More	 importantly,	 it	
																																								 																				
38	See	T	Nichols,	Ownership,	Control,	and	Ideology	(London:	George	Allen	&	Unwin,	1969)	pp	238-9.	
39	JM	Keynes,	‘The	End	of	Laissez-Faire’	(London:	Hogarth	Press,	1926).	For	further	discussion	of	the	
reasons	for	shareholder	passivity	during	this	period,	see	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	pp	123-30.	
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was	extremely	difficult	for	the	shareholders	to	change	the	directors,	which	meant	that,	as	long	
as	management	retained	the	confidence	of	the	directors,	they	would	remain	in	place	and	had	
considerable	 autonomy	 in	 terms	 of	 implementing	 the	 company’s	 strategy. 40 	The	 right	 of	
shareholders	to	remove	a	director	of	a	particular	company	was	governed	by	the	company’s	
articles	(and	so	reflected	the	terms	on	which	the	shareholders	had	joined	the	company).	The	
default	 rule	 provided	 by	 Table	 A	 was	 that	 directors	 could	 only	 be	 removed	 by	 special	
resolution,41	or	extraordinary	resolution,42	both	types	of	resolution	requiring	the	support	of	
75%	 of	 those	 entitled	 to	 vote	 and	 actually	 voting	 in	 person	 or	 by	 proxy. 43 	Nor	 were	
shareholders	 in	 listed	 companies	 in	 a	 better	 position:	 even	 by	 1932,	 the	 London	 Stock	
Exchange	 only	 required	 that	 all	 directors	 of	 listed	 companies	 be	 removable	 by	 special	
resolution,44	so	that	only	a	shareholder	with	a	75%	shareholding	could	definitely	 ‘get	rid	of	
management’.45	Recent	research	has	found	that	76.2%	of	companies	 incorporated	 in	1892,	
regardless	 of	 size,	 adopted	 the	 Table	 A	 default	 rule,	 requiring	 a	 75%	majority	 to	 remove	
directors.46	Companies	 such	as	 ICI,	Rolls	Royce	and	Vickers	Armstrong	set	 the	 threshold	as	
high	as	was	legally	permitted.47	Even	if	shareholders	tried	to	bring	about	a	change,	Hannah’s	
																																								 																				
40	As	Marris	pointed	out,	shareholders	could	only	remove	a	senior	manager	below	board	level	by	
threatening	to	replace	a	majority	of	the	directors	with	their	nominees.	R	Marris,	The	Economic	Theory	
of	‘Managerial’	Capitalism	(London:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	1964)	p	16.	This	was	practically	impossible	
before	1948.	
41	Companies	Act	1862,	Table	A,	Art	65.	
42	Companies	Act	1906,	Table	A,	Art	86;	Companies	Act	1929,	Table	A,	Art	80.	
43	Companies	Act	1862,	s	55	and	Companies	Act	1908,	ss	69(1)	and	(2).	A	special	resolution	also	
required	a	second	meeting	to	confirm	the	decision	by	simple	majority	until	1929:	see	Companies	Act	
1862,	s	51	and	Companies	Act	1908,	s	69(2).	The	Companies	Act	1929	dispensed	with	the	requirement	
of	a	second	meeting	for	a	special	resolution.	As	Mr	Justice	Cohen	observed,	the	directors	tended	to	
hold	all	the	proxies	for	the	general	meeting:	see	Minutes	of	Evidence	Taken	Before	the	Company	Law	
Amendment	Committee	(London:	HMSO	1943-1944),	para	7071.	
44	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	pp	130	and	278.	This	had	not	been	a	listing	requirement	in	1906:	see	
Rules	and	regulations	of	the	London	Stock	Exchange	(London:	The	Stock	Exchange,	1906)	set	out	in	L	
Davis,	L	Neal,	EN	White,	‘How	it	all	began:	the	rise	of	listing	requirements	on	the	London,	Berlin,	Paris,	
and	New	York	stock	exchanges’	(2003)	38	The	International	Journal	of	Accounting	117,	Appendix	A.	
45	Evidence	of	Samuel	Cash,	partner	in	Vizards,	Minutes	of	Evidence	(1943-1944)	above	n	43,	para	
10191.	
46	TW	Guinnane,	R	Harris,	NR	Lamoreaux,	‘Contractual	Freedom	and	the	Evolution	of	Corporate	
Control	in	Britain,	1862	to	1929’	(2014)	NBER	Working	Paper	No	20481	pp	20	and	27.	
47	E	McGaughey,	Participation	in	Corporate	Governance,	Unpublished	LSE	PhD	Thesis,	4th	November	
2014	p	84.	
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2007	research	shows	that	the	directors	and	their	associates	normally	kept	between	a	quarter	
and	a	third	of	the	shares	upon	flotation,48	which	would	have	made	their	removal	impossible,	
and	gave	them	freedom	to	put	in	place	credible,	long-term	management	structures.		
Directors	 were	 also	 commonly	 entrenched	 through	 provisions	 in	 the	 articles.	 By	 default,	
boards	 were	 ‘staggered’	 with	 one	 third	 of	 the	 directors	 required	 to	 retire	 each	 year	 but	
available	for	re-election	by	the	general	meeting	by	simple	majority.49	However,	this	offered	
little	help	to	restive	shareholders	because,	as	a	default	rule,	 it	was	avoided	in	a	number	of	
ways.	Some	companies	made	no	provision	for	removal	of	directors	whatsoever,	which	meant	
that	the	shareholders	had	to	pass	a	special	resolution	to	change	the	articles	before	they	could	
vote	 on	 removal	 of	 directors.50	Before	 1906,	most	 companies	made	 bespoke	 provision	 to	
designate	one	or	more	managing	directors	who	were	exempt	from	retirement	by	rotation.51	
In	1906,	Table	A	was	amended	to	reflect	this	practice	and	provided	a	default	rule	allowing	
companies	to	appoint	managing	directors,	who	were	exempt	from	retirement	by	rotation,	and	
this	was	rarely	displaced.52	Finally,	it	was	a	common	practice	for	the	founders	of	the	company	
to	provide	that	they	would	remain	directors	for	life	or	for	a	certain	number	of	years	provided	
																																								 																				
48	Hannah	(2007)	above	n	8,	pp	415-7.	
49	Companies	Act	1862,	Table	A,	Arts	58,	60	and	61;	Companies	Act	1906,	Table	A,	Arts	78,	80	and	81;	
Companies	Act	1929,	Table	A,	Arts	73,	75	and	76	(providing	for	re-election	by	default).	Guinnane	et	al	
(2014)	above	n	46,	p	10	suggest	that	this	was	perhaps	to	ensure	continuity	in	management	of	the	
enterprise.	
50	Imperial	Hydropathic	Hotel	Co	v	Hampson	(1882)	23	C.D.	1;	see	also	Report	of	the	Committee	on	
Company	Law	Amendment	(Cm	6659,	1945)	(Cohen	Report),	paragraph	130.	
51	In	Guinnane	et	al’s	samples,	64	percent	of	their	sample	of	companies	registered	in	1892	and	92	
percent	of	their	sample	from	Burdett’s	Stock	Exchange	Official	Intelligence	(1892)	made	provision	
along	these	lines:	TW	Guinnane,	R	Harris	and	NR	Lamoreaux,	‘Contractual	Freedom	and	Corporate	
Governance	in	Britain	in	the	Late	Nineteenth	and	Early	Twentieth	Centuries’	(2017)	91	Business	
History	Review	227,	244.	
52	Companies	Act	1906,	Table	A,	Art	72;	Companies	Act	1929,	Table	A,	Art	68.	In	Guinnane	et	al’s	(ibid)	
1912	and	1927	samples	virtually	all	companies	adopted	this	provision.	By	default,	the	general	meeting	
could	remove	a	managing	director	or	manager	from	his	position	by	simple	majority,	with	44.9%	and	
62%	of	companies	in	Guinnane	et	al’s	1912	and	1927	samples	adopting	this	provision.	Presumably	the	
directors	could	simply	reappoint	the	managing	director	or	manager	in	the	unlikely	event	of	removal	
by	the	general	meeting.	
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they	 satisfied	 a	 shareholding	 requirement.	 53 	These	 strategies,	 which	 were	 adopted	 by	 a	
significant	minority	 of	 companies	 in	 Guinnane	 et	 al’s	 1892	 sample,54	meant	 that	 a	 special	
resolution	to	change	the	articles	was	required,	followed	by	a	vote	to	remove	the	director.		
Nor	did	amalgamations	and	mergers	during	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century	generally	
result	in	changes	to	the	directors	and	managers.55	These	operations	proceeded	consensually,	
with	directors	only	departing	by	consent,	and	managerial	hierarchies	 frequently	 remaining	
intact,	 particularly	 in	 the	early,	 largely	 anti-competitive	 amalgamations	 in	which	 individual	
companies	remained	separately	managed	under	a	holding	company.56	This	was	a	far	cry	from	
the	hostile	takeovers	of	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century	in	which	a	bidder	explicitly	
sought	to	change	the	incumbent	directors	as	soon	as	they	gained	control.	
These	practices	meant	 that	 shareholder	 removal	of	directors	was,	 as	 an	1894	book	aimed	
investors	put	it,	‘in	practice…	almost	an	impossibility.’57	However,	the	effective	entrenchment	
of	directors	and	managers,	with	shareholders	becoming	increasingly	peripheral,	did	not	give	
rise	to	controversy,	and	was	endorsed	by	the	company	law	literature	during	this	period.58	
Looking	beyond	removal	of	directors,	shareholders	had	few	other	options	open	to	them.	The	
law	did	not	allow	them	to	interfere	with	the	decisions	of	the	directors.	In	a	number	of	cases	
at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 the	 courts	 ruled	 that	 a	 simple	 majority	 of	
																																								 																				
53	This	was	common	where	a	business	was	incorporated	for	the	first	time:	see	FB	Palmer,	Company	
Precedents	for	Use	in	Relation	to	Companies	Subject	to	the	Companies	(Consolidation)	Act,	1908	
(Volume	1)	(London:	Stevens,	1912)	pp	981-2.		
54	Guinnane	at	al	(2014)	above	n	46,	p	20.	
55	J	Franks,	C	Mayer	and	S	Rossi,	‘Spending	Less	Time	with	the	Family:	The	Decline	of	Family	
Ownership	in	the	United	Kingdom’	in	R	Morck	(ed),	A	History	of	Corporate	Governance	around	the	
World:	Family	Business	Groups	to	Professional	Managers	(Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press,	2005)	
pp	595-7	showing	that,	between	1919	and	1939,	‘on	average,	two	thirds	of	the	target	directors	
remained	on	the	target’s	board	after	the	acquisition’.	
56	See	for	example	L	Hannah,	The	Rise	of	the	Corporate	Economy	(London:	Methuen,	1976)	pp	86-7;	
Franks	et	al	(2005)	above	n	55,	p	584.		
57	JD	Walker	&	Watson,	Investor’s	and	Shareholder’s	Guide	(Edinburgh:	E&S	Livingstone,	1894)	pp	142-
3.	
58	Stiebel’s	1920	book	simply	stated	that	the	articles	‘should	empower	the	company	to	remove	
directors	by	extraordinary	or	special	resolution’:	See	A	Stiebel,	Company	Law	and	Precedents	(London:	
Sweet	&	Maxwell	Ltd,	2nd	edn,	1920)	pp	396	and	423.	
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shareholders	could	not	give	binding	instructions	to	the	directors.	These	rulings	were	justified	
either	by	reference	to	the	bargain	made	between	the	shareholders,59	or	to	the	need	to	protect	
minority	shareholders,60	or	to	the	company	as	a	separate	legal	entity.61	It	is	at	least	arguable	
that,	whilst	the	judges	were	justifying	their	decisions	on	the	basis	of	conventional	company	
law	concerns,	they	were	in	fact	reflecting	the	emerging	–	and	widely	accepted	–	ideology	that,	
in	 order	 for	 businesses	 to	 be	 successful,	 management	 had	 to	 be	 free	 from	 interference.	
Further	 support	 for	 this	 argument	 comes	 from	 the	 United	 States,	 which	 saw	 similar	 legal	
developments	 around	 the	 same	 time,	 but	 justified	 on	 entirely	 different	 bases.	 There	 the	
courts	prevented	shareholder	interference	with	management	on	the	basis	that	the	power	to	
manage	was	given	to	the	directors	by	the	law	of	the	state	of	incorporation,62	or	on	basis	that	
it	would	not	be	appropriate	to	hold	the	directors	responsible	to	the	corporation	if	they	could	
be	forced	to	act	with	others	who	could	control	their	acts.63	Reviewing	these	developments,	
Hurst	identified	a	minority	shareholder	logic,	but	also	suggested	that	‘the	peculiar	hostility	of	
the	courts’	to	attempts	by	shareholders	to	control	the	directors	‘perhaps	reflected	the	high	
value	which	prevailing	opinion	put	on	 the	entrepreneurial	 function	 in	 the	growth	decades	
from	about	1870	to	the	1930s	depression.’64		
Likewise,	 it	was	 very	difficult	 for	 shareholders	 to	 challenge	directors’	 decisions	before	 the	
courts.	 The	 law	 required	 that	 directors’	 decisions	 be	 oriented	 towards	 the	 ‘benefit	 of	 the	
																																								 																				
59	Automatic	Self-Cleansing	Filter	Syndicate	Co	Ltd	v	Cuninghame	[1906]	2	Ch	34;	Quin	&	Axtens	Ltd	v	
Salmon	[1909]	A.C.	442	pp	443-4.	
60	See	the	decisions	of	the	Court	of	Appeal	in	both	Cuninghame	[1906]	2	Ch	34	and	Quin	&	Axtens	Ltd	
[1909]	1	Ch	311	.	
61	The	Gramophone	and	Typewriter	Ltd	v	Stanley	[1908]	2	KB	89.	
62	Hoyt	v.	Thompson's	Executors,	(1859)	19	N.Y.	207	p	216,	ruling	that	the	directors’	powers	are	
‘original	and	undelegated’.		
63	Charlestown	Boot	&	Shoe	Co	v	Dunsmore	(1880)	60	NH	85;	Manice	v	Powell	(1911)	201	NY	194	pp	
200-1.		
64	JW	Hurst,	The	legitimacy	of	the	business	corporation	in	the	law	of	the	United	States,	1780-1970	
(Charlottesville,	VA:	University	of	Virginia	Press,	1970)	pp	79-80.	
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company’,65	a	 concept	 widely	 interpreted	 as	 referring	 to	 the	 commercial	 interests	 of	 the	
shareholders	rather	than	the	interests	of	the	separate	legal	entity.66	However,	it	was	clear	that	
the	law	allowed	the	directors	to	take	account	of	and	spend	money	on	interests	other	than	
those	 of	 shareholders,	 provided	 this	 was	 ‘reasonably	 incidental	 to	 the	 carrying	 on	 of	 the	
business	of	the	company’.67	Recently,	a	number	of	scholars	have	challenged	the	conventional	
understanding	of	this	line	of	case	law,	arguing	that	the	‘interests	of	the	company’	was	never	
defined	by	the	courts,	and	that	all	these	decisions	turned	on	the	narrow	point	that	gratuitous	
payments	 were	 void	 for	 ultra	 vires	 because	 they	 were	 not	 reasonably	 incidental	 to	 the	
business	objectives	specified	in	the	company’s	memorandum.68	Marc	Moore	argues	that	the	
correct	interpretation	of	these	cases	is	that	‘corporate	funds	could	legitimately	be	devoted	to	
shareholders	and/or	employees	as	the	directors	reasonably	deemed	fit	for	the	furtherance	of	
the	 company’s	 constitutionally	 specified	 line(s)	 of	 business,	 so	 long	as	 the	 interests	of	 the	
business	as	such	were	genuinely	being	promoted	in	some	way.’69		
As	well	as	according	with	the	emergent	theory	of	management	as	balancing	the	competing	
interests	at	stake	in	the	enterprise	and	seeking	to	innovate,	this	new	interpretation	of	the	case	
law	fits	with	contemporaneous	theoretical	developments	in	the	legal	literature.	‘Real	entity’	
theory	was	the	subject	of	considerable	academic	discussion	throughout	the	early	twentieth	
																																								 																				
65	Hutton	v	West	Cork	Railway	Co	(1883)	23	Ch	D	654,	per	Bowen	LJ	in	the	Court	of	Appeal.	See	also	
Parke	v	Daily	News	[1962]	Ch	927.	Both	these	cases	concerned	the	payment	of	gratuities	to	directors	
or	employees	after	the	company	had	ceased	to	be	a	going	concern.		
66	See	e.g.	J	Parkinson,	Corporate	Power	and	Responsibility	(Oxford:	OUP,	1993)	p	77.	
67	The	directors	had	very	broad	discretion	to	make	expenditures	aimed	at	conducting	‘the	business	to	
the	most	advantage’	where	the	company	was	a	going	concern:	see	Hampson	v	Price’s	Patent	Candle	
Co	(1876)	45	L.	J.	Ch.	437.	In	Evans	v	Brunner,	Mond	&	Co	[1921]	Ch	359,	this	extended	to	funding	
scientific	education	in	universities,	considered	by	the	directors	to	be	essential	for	the	business	which	
‘depended	increasingly	upon	the	advance	of	pure	science.	The	company's	greatest	difficulty	was	to	
find	men	sufficiently	equipped	by	their	previous	studies	to	undertake	research	work.’	The	limits	of	the	
principle	were	only	reached	in	Tomkinson	v	South-Eastern	Railway	Company	(1887)	35	Ch.D.	675,	
where	the	court	ruled	ultra	vires	a	spending	decision,	rejecting	as	‘extravagant’	the	argument	that	
‘any	expenditure	which	may	indirectly	conduce	to	the	benefit	of	the	company	is	intra	vires’.	
68	See	for	example,	M	Moore,	‘Shareholder	Primacy,	Labour	and	the	Historic	Ambivalence	of	UK	
Company	Law’	(2016)	University	of	Cambridge	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	Series	No	40/2016;	J	
Mukwiri,	‘Myth	of	Shareholder	Primacy	in	English	Law'	(2013)	24(2)	European	Business	Law	Review	
217.	
69	Moore	(2016)	ibid	at	18.	
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century	 following	 its	 importation	 from	Germany	by	Maitland	 in	 1900,	 and	 its	 adoption	by	
political	 pluralists	 such	 as	 Laski. 70 	That	 theory	 emphasised	 the	 social	 existence	 of	 the	
corporate	 entity	 as	 a	 result	 of	 cooperative	 activity	 towards	 a	 common	goal,	with	 a	 strong	
implication	that	the	shareholders	were	no	longer	‘owners’.	Indeed,	whilst	not	being	in	favour	
of	 the	 emergence	 of	 ‘semi-socialism’,	 Keynes	 referred	 to	 these	 developments	 as	 ‘natural	
tendencies’	that	were	resulting	in	‘semi-autonomous	corporations’.71	
These	rules	and	practices	did	not	mean	that	the	directors	were	entirely	unresponsive	to	the	
shareholders.72	It	was	common	 to	 include	a	 shareholding	 ‘qualification’	 for	directors,73	and	
there	is	evidence	that	directors	paid	dividends	steadily	to	shareholders	during	this	period.74	
Hidden	reserves	were	commonly	relied	upon	to	allow	regular	and	acceptable	dividends	to	be	
paid,	 so	 that	 dispersed	 shareholders	 of	 large	 companies,	who	 had	 little	 access	 to	 reliable	
accounting	information,	remained	passive.75	However,	the	practical	effect	of	the	law	was	that	
shareholders	had	little	choice	but	to	accept	the	directors	and	managers	of	the	companies	in	
which	they	held	shares,	and	decisions	were	oriented	to	the	interests	of	the	organisation,	and	
towards	fairness	to	the	various	contributors	to	the	corporate	enterprise.76		
																																								 																				
70	FW	Maitland	‘Moral	Personality	and	Legal	Personality’	(1905)	6	Journal	of	the	Society	of	
Comparative	Legislation	192;	H	Laski,	‘The	Basis	of	Vicarious	Liability’	(1916)	26	Yale	LJ	105	p	134;	H	
Laski,	‘The	Personality	of	Associations’	(1916)	29	Harvard	Law	Review	404.	For	discussion	see	R	Harris,	
‘The	Transplantation	of	the	Legal	Discourse	on	Corporate	Personality	Theories:	From	German	
Codification	to	British	Political	Pluralism	and	American	Big	Business’	(2006)	63	Wash.	&	Lee	L.	Rev.	
1421.	
71	Keynes	(1926)	above	n	39.	
72	Nichols	(1969)	above	n	38	pp	78-9;	P.	Ireland,	‘The	Corporation	and	the	New	Aristocracy	of	Finance’	
in	J-P	Robé,	A	Lyon-Caen,	S	Vernac	(eds),	Multinationals	and	the	Constitutionalization	of	the	World	
Power	System	(Oxford:	Routledge	2016)	p	80.	
73	See	FB	Palmer,	Company	law:	a	practical	handbook	for	lawyers	and	business	men	(London:	Stevens,	
1902)	p	151.	In	1906,	the	London	Stock	Exchange	required	listed	companies	to	have	a	director	
shareholding	qualification	in	their	articles.	Whilst	no	minimum	level	was	specified,	in	practice	it	was	
set	at	a	level	representing	‘a	substantial	proportion	of	an	individual	director’s	wealth’:	G	Campbell	
and	J	Turner,	‘Substitutes	for	Legal	Protection:	Corporate	Governance	and	Dividends	in	Victorian	
Britain’	(2011)	64	Economic	History	Review	571,	582-3.	Mandatory	rules	in	this	area	were	rejected	by	
the	Greene	Committee	(see	Report	of	the	Company	Law	Amendment	Committee	(Cmnd	2657,	1926)	
para	53).	
74	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	p255.		
75	Ibid	at	295	
76	Nichols	(1969)	above	n	38,	pp	53-4;	Keynes	(1926)	above	n	39.	
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Compared	with	the	current	position,	 it	 is	striking	that	directors	and	managers	were	central	
and	 entrenched,	 whilst	 shareholders	 had	 become	 peripheral.77	Entrenchment,	 consensual	
mergers,	 rules	 about	 shareholder	 instructions	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 judicial	 review	 of	 business	
decisions	 created	 board	 autonomy,	 and	 allowed	 for	 the	 emergence	 of	 professional	
management	who	–	 in	 the	 language	of	 today’s	 economics	 –	 could	 specialise	 their	 skills	 to	
those	of	the	firm	and	make	credible	commitments	to	those	they	managed.		
	
(b) The	missing	concept	of	the	manager	in	company	law	
The	 last	 section	 shows	 that	 the	 autonomy	 of	 directors	 in	 relation	 to	 shareholders	 was	
established	by	law	and	practice.	However,	the	law	had	less	to	say	about	professional	managers,	
being	content	simply	to	leave	them	under	the	control	of	the	directors,	and	never	developing	
a	 positive	 conception	 of	 the	managerial	 function.	 In	 company	 law,	managers	were	 simply	
viewed	 as	 employees, 78 	with	 a	 limited	 duty	 of	 good	 faith	 implied	 into	 their	 contract	 of	
employment,79	whilst	in	labour	law	they	were	treated	as	representatives	of	the	employer.80	
The	law	allowed	directors	to	delegate	functions	to	managers,	provided	there	was	a	power	to	
do	so	in	the	articles,	as	there	was	by	default,81	and	its	scope	increased	over	time.	As	discussed	
above,	 the	 practice	 evolved	 of	 the	 directors	 appointing	 one	 or	 more	 of	 their	 number	 as	
																																								 																				
77	For	a	rare	example	in	which	a	managing	director	with	a	ten	year	contract	was	ousted	from	his	
position	by	a	holding	company	which	had	acquired	all	the	shares	in	the	company	and	altered	the	
articles,	allowing	it	to	remove	any	director	by	notice,	terminating	his	contract	and	giving	him	a	right	to	
damages:	see	Southern	Foundries	(1926)	Ltd	v	Shirlaw	[1940]	AC	701.	For	further	discussion	see	
McGaughey	(2014)	above	n	47,	pp	83-4.	
78	Quail	comments	that	‘A	sharp	line	was	drawn	between	the	directors	(seen	as	partial	owners	
representative	of	the	owners	as	a	whole)	and	managers	(seen	as	employees).	Firms	were	viewed	as	
sets	of	operations	carried	out	by	employees	but	initiated	and	supervised	by	directors	in	a	manner	
analogous	to	the	separate	roles	of	politicians	and	civil	servants.’	Quail	(2002)	above	n	37,	p	7.		
79	Robb	v	Green	[1895]	2	Q.B.	315,	317.	
80	PL	Davies	and	M	Freedland,	‘The	Complexities	of	the	Employing	Enterprise’	in	G	Davidov	&	B	
Langille	(eds),	Boundaries	and	Frontiers	of	Labour	Law	(Oxford:	Hart,	2006)	p	278.	
81	For	example,	Companies	Act	1862,	Table	A,	Art	68	allowed	the	directors	to	delegate	to	individual	
directors	or	committees,	who	would	remain	subject	‘to	any	regulations	that	may	be	imposed	on	them	
by	the	directors’,	paving	the	way	for	a	distinction	in	practice	between	executive	and	non-executive	
directors.	
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managing	directors	to	act	as	the	head	of	management,	and	the	courts	recognised	the	validity	
of	 these	 contractual	 arrangements.82	Table	 A	 of	 1906	 caught	 up	with	 this	 practice,	 giving	
companies	power	by	default	to	‘from	time	to	time	appoint	one	or	more	of	their	body	to	the	
office	 of	managing	 director	 or	manager’.83	Responsibility	 for	 the	 actions	 of	 the	managing	
director	 remained	with	 him	 (as	 a	 fiduciary)	 and	 with	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 board,	 although	 the	
requirements	of	diligence	on	 the	other	 (non-managing)	directors	were	not	 stringent.84	The	
common	thread	running	through	all	these	changes	was	that	the	managing	director	or	manager	
had	to	also	be	a	director,	and	so	a	connection	was	maintained	between	the	board	and	the	
management	through	the	person	of	the	managing	director	or	manager.85	Whilst	there	may	
have	been	considerable	 separation	between	directors	and	management	 in	practice,	 it	was	
viewed	as	essential	for	a	representative	of	management	to	appear	before	the	directors.86			
Faced	with	 these	 changes	 in	 practice,	 the	 courts	 had	 to	 identify	 the	 legal	 implications	 of	
appointing	 a	 managing	 director,	 gradually	 moving	 from	 viewing	 him	 as	 ‘only	 an	 ordinary	
director	 entrusted	 with	 some	 special	 powers’87	to	 treating	 him	 as	 both	 a	manager	 and	 a	
director,88	with	his	managerial	functions	determined	by	contract.89	In	Horn	v	Henry	Faulder	&	
Co,	90	the	court	moved	beyond	managing	directors	and	considered	the	outer	 limits	of	what	
could	be	delegated	to	managers.	It	concluded	that,	on	the	grounds	of	ultra	vires,	neither	the	
																																								 																				
82	See	for	example	Scrutton	J	in	Nelson	v	James	Nelson	&	Sons	Limited	[1913]	2	KB	471	describing	the	
power	given	to	the	directors	to	appoint	a	managing	director	as	‘a	very	ordinary	one	in	articles’.		
83	Companies	Act	1906,	Table	A,	Art	72;	Companies	Act	1929,	Table	A,	Art	68.		
84	Directors	would	only	be	liable	for	‘gross’	negligence,	essentially	a	lack	of	good	faith:	Lagunas	Nitrate	
Company	v	Lagunas	Syndicate	[1899]	2	Ch.	392	per	Lindley	LJ.		
85	In	Craven-Ellis	v	Canons	Ltd	[1936]	2	K.B.	403	at	413-4,	Greene	LJ	took	the	view	that	‘A	managing	
director	is	in	a	very	different	position	to	that	of	a	mere	manager	since	he	is	able	to	attend	and	vote	at	
meetings	of	the	board,	and	from	the	point	of	view	of	the	company	it	was	of	importance	that	the	
person	managing	its	affairs	should	be	in	a	position	to	do	this.’	
86	See	for	example	Burton	(1899)	above	n	23,	p	5,	noting	that	sometimes	the	roles	of	managing	
director	and	manager	were	combined,	and	that	it	was	essential	for	full	reporting	to	the	board	to	
occur.		
87	In	re	Newspaper	Proprietary	Syndicate	Ltd	[1900]	2	Ch	349.	
88	Southern	Foundries	(1926)	Ltd	v	Shirlaw	[1940]	A.C.	701;	Goodwin	v	Brewster	(1951)	32	TC	80.	
89	Per	Lord	Reid	in	Harold	Holdsworth	&	Co	(Wakefield)	Ltd	v	Caddies	[1955]	1	All	ER	725,	738.		
90	(1908)	99	LT	524.		
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company	 nor	 the	 board	 could,	 under	 standard	 articles	 vesting	management	 in	 the	 board,	
delegate	to	a	manager	on	terms	that	he	would	have	full	power	to	conduct	the	business	(with	
the	exception	of	capital	expenditures	and	litigation)	of	the	department	without	interference	
from	the	directors.	Hence	directors	had	to	retain	a	residual	power	to	 intervene,	consistent	
with	the	current	idea	that	the	directors	bear	some	residual	responsibility,	via	their	fiduciary	
and	common	law	duties,	for	the	acts	of	the	person	to	whom	power	is	delegated.	Likewise,	in	
another	case,	the	court	ruled	that,	where	management	was	delegated	to	a	general	manager,	
‘the	only	duties	which	[the	board]	could	delegate	to	the	general	manager	are	those	which	
belong	to	the	management	of	the	ordinary	commercial	business	of	such	a	company.’91	Hence	
there	was	a	separation	between	the	management	function,	which	could	be	delegated	by	the	
board,	and	the	control	function,	which	could	not.	While	these	cases	provided	legal	support	
for	delegation	of	business	decision-making	and	management	to	managers	below	board	level,	
the	management	function	was	never	positively	defined.		
By	interpreting	the	default	articles	as	making	appointment	of	management	a	matter	for	the	
directors	alone,	the	law	created	scope	for	the	emergence	of	the	managerially-led	enterprise.	
As	 we	 have	 seen,	 there	 was	 no	 positive	 conception	 of	 the	 role	 of	 management,	 and	
managerial	autonomy	was	achieved	indirectly,	through	a	combination	of	entrenched	boards,	
bespoke	articles,	 and	 the	non-interventionist	 approach	 taken	by	 the	 courts.	 There	was	no	
significant	 opposition	 to	 director	 and	 management	 control	 in	 the	 legal	 and	 management	
literatures	of	the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	but	equally,	managerial	autonomy	rested	
on	weak	legal	foundations.	This,	then,	was	the	context	in	which	the	Cohen	Committee	was	
appointed	in	1943	to	conduct	a	review	of	company	law.	
	
																																								 																				
91	In	re	County	Palatine	Loan	and	Discount	Company.	Cartmell’s	Case	(1874)	L.R.	9	Ch.App.	691,	per	Sir	
G.	Mellish,	L.J.		
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4.	THE	COHEN	COMMITTEE	AND	THE	COMPANIES	ACT	1948	
‘Finding	the	shareholder	a	passing	investor,	we	have	insisted	that	he	is	an	owner	and	
a	member	of	an	electorate.	 Finding	managements	 to	be	hirers	of	 capital,	we	have	
tried	 to	 bury	 this	 disquieting	 fact	 by	 calling	 them	hired	 hands	 of	 the	 shareholder-
owners.	Finding	"control"	to	have	slid	away	from	"ownership,"	we	have	sought	to	put	
the	 control	 back	 with	 the	 ownership	 where	 it	 "belongs."	 Pressed	 by	 the	 evident	
economic	need	for	flexible	centralized	management,	we	have	sought	to	decentralize	
decision-making	and	offer	it	to	the	multitude.’92	
The	report	of	the	Cohen	Committee	sought	to	put	control	of	companies	back	into	the	hands	
of	shareholders,	paying	no	regard	to	the	emergence	of	professional	management	described	
in	 sections	2	and	3	above.	 It	 recommended	a	number	of	 regulatory	 interventions	 into	 the	
internal	governance	of	companies	in	order	to	achieve	this	goal,	including,	most	importantly,	a	
mandatory	 right	 for	 the	 shareholders	 to	 remove	 the	 directors	 by	 simple	 majority.	 Its	
recommendations	were	implemented	in	the	Companies	Act	of	1947,	which	was	consolidated	
into	 the	Companies	Act	1948.93	These	 legal	changes,	along	with	 the	growth	of	 institutional	
shareholders	 in	 the	 post	 war	 period,94 	radically	 reoriented	 the	 UK’s	 system	 of	 corporate	
governance	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century.	Together,	they	created	the	conditions	
for	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 hostile	 takeover,	 which	 undermined	 the	 fragile	 autonomy	 of	
managers	and	sidelined	the	balancing	approach.		
																																								 																				
92	B.	Manning,	‘The	American	Stockholder’	(1958)	67	The	Yale	Law	Journal	1477,	1490.	
93	Report	of	the	Committee	on	Company	Law	Amendment	(Cm	6659,	1945)	(Cohen	Report).	
94	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	pp	344-5,	noting	that	by	1969,	retail	investors	no	longer	owned	a	
majority	of	the	shares	of	UK	public	companies.	High	tax	rates	encouraged	individuals	to	sell	their	
shares	and	invest	in	other,	more	tax-efficient	assets,	including	pensions	and	life	insurance:	see	ibid,	pp	
81-2	and	341-9.	
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Driven	by	concerns	about	 the	quality	of	 financial	 reporting	 following	 the	 financial	 crash	of	
1929,	 as	well	 as	 other	 corporate	 scandals,95	the	 Cohen	 Committee	was	 asked	 to	 consider	
amendments	to	company	law,	focusing	on	‘the	safeguards	afforded	for	investors	and	for	the	
public	 interest.’ 96 	Bircher	 notes	 that	 the	 decision	 to	 set	 up	 the	 Cohen	 Committee	 was	
motivated	by	a	perceived	need	for	‘greater	publicity…	and…	better	safeguards	for	investors	
and	shareholders’	and	the	‘growing	claim	that	the	interests	of	the	community,	as	distinct	from	
those	of	the	shareholders,	should	have	more	recognition	in	the	formation	and	conduct	of	a	
corporation’.97		
Both	investor	protection	and	public	interest	concerns	could	be	met,	at	least	in	part,	through	
reform	 of	 disclosure	 and	 accounting. 98 	The	 Cohen	 Committee	 modernised	 financial	
accounting.	 It	proposed	 that	companies	should	be	 required	 to	disclose	an	audited	balance	
sheet	which	gives	‘a	true	and	fair	view	of	the	state	of	affairs	of	the	company’,	and	a	profit	and	
loss	 account,	 drawn	 up	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 defined	 accounting	 standards,	 99 	whilst	 parent	
companies	should	produce	consolidated	accounts	for	the	group	as	a	whole.100	The	Committee	
recommended	prohibition	of	the	practice	of	creating	secret	reserves,	which	directors	used	to	
smooth	dividend	payments	and	keep	shareholders	happy,	in	particular	because	it	distorted	
																																								 																				
95	P	Bircher,	From	the	Companies	Act	of	1929	to	the	Companies	Act	of	1948:	A	Study	of	Change	in	the	
Law	and	Practice	of	Accounting	(Oxford:	Routledge,	1991)	pp	80-90;	J	Maltby,	‘Was	the	Companies	
Act	1947	A	Response	to	a	National	Crisis?’	(2000)	5	Accounting	History	31,	38	and	47	
96	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	p	7.	
97	P.	Bircher,	‘Company	Law	Reform	and	the	Board	of	Trade,	1929–1943’	(1988)	18	Accounting	and	
Business	Research	107	at	116-7.	References	to	the	community	and	public	interests	in	the	mandate	
were	considerably	‘watered	down’:	B.	Clift,	‘The	Labour	Movement	and	Company	Law	Reform	1918-
1945’	(1999)	Sheffield	Political	Economy	Research	Centre	Research	Paper	No.1	pp	34-7.	
98	The	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	5,	stated	that	its	proposals	for	information	disclosure	
would	‘ensure	that	as	much	information	as	is	reasonably	required	shall	be	made	available	both	to	the	
shareholders	and	creditors	of	the	companies	concerned	and	to	the	general	public.’	
99	ibid,	paras	96	and	103.	
100	ibid,	para	119.	This	recommendation	was	specifically	targeted	at	protecting	shareholders,	who	
were	lacking	‘information	as	to	the	financial	position	and	results	of	the	undertakings	in	which	they	are	
interested.’	
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the	 pricing	 of	 shares.101	The	 Committee	 confidently	 rejected	 claims	 that	 ‘if	 fully	 informed,	
shareholders	would	press	for	excessive	dividends’.102		
Beyond	enhancing	accounting	requirements,	however,	the	Cohen	Committee	gave	almost	no	
attention	to	other	ways	 in	which	company	law	might	protect	the	public	 interest	as	distinct	
from	 the	 interests	 of	 shareholders. 103 	Nor	 was	 the	 position	 of	 professional	 management	
within	companies	ever	discussed	during	the	Committee’s	hearings,	and	it	was	rarely	raised	in	
any	 of	 the	memoranda	 that	 it	 considered.	 Instead,	 influential	members	 of	 the	 committee	
simply	proceeded	on	the	a	priori	basis	that	re-establishing	shareholder	control	over	directors	
was	fundamental.	During	the	Committee’s	hearings,	Mr	Justice	Cohen	commented	that	‘The	
view	upon	which	company	law	is	based,	I	think,	is	that	the	shareholders	elect	the	directors	to	
conduct	 their	 business’	 and	 that	 directors’	 remuneration	 comes	 out	 of	 the	 shareholders’	
money.104	Similarly,	Professor	Goodhart	stated	that	‘the	most	important	point	in	company	law’	
is	‘the	question	of	shareholders’	control’.105	Other	members	assumed	that	the	shareholders	
were	 the	 ‘proprietors’	 of	 the	 business,	 leading	 them	 to	 assume	 that	 control	 should	 be	
reconnected	to	ownership	in	order	to	ensure	efficient	use	of	corporate	resources.106	Finally,	
the	trade	unions,	which	might	have	pushed	for	changes	in	a	more	pluralist	direction,	had	little	
meaningful	 input	into	the	work	of	the	Committee.	Their	representative	frequently	failed	to	
attend	 meetings; 107 	their	 memorandum	 and	 representations	 focussed	 on	 the	 role	 of	
																																								 																				
101	ibid,	para	101.	This	was	a	particularly	controversial	topic,	and	much	time	was	spent	discussing	it.	
102	Ibid.	
103	It	did	propose	giving	the	courts	power	to	require,	and	making	it	easier	for	shareholders	to	demand,	
a	Board	of	Trade	investigation	into	the	management	of	the	company	where	this	was	‘in	the	public	
interest’.	(Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	156)	However,	there	was	no	proposal	to	allow	any	
group	other	than	the	shareholders	to	demand	an	investigation,	and	discussions	about	the	
introduction	of	public	shareholders	(see	for	example,	Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	above	n	43,	
Appendix	M	at	169)	or	company	commissioners	(see	for	example	ibid,	para	8134)	during	the	hearings	
made	no	impact	on	the	final	report.	
104	Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	above	n	43,	para	7038	
105	ibid,	para	9479	
106	See	for	example	Mr	Wilmot’s	description	of	shareholders	as	‘proprietors	of	the	business’	(ibid,	
para	1743)	and	his	reference	to	the	‘original	conception	of	control	of	the	company	by	its	proprietors’	
(ibid,	para	3682).			
107	Clift	(1991)	above	n	97,	p	44.	
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disclosure	in	assisting	with	wage	negotiations;108	and	they	did	not	make	any	submissions	on	
more	fundamental	questions	of	internal	control	or	worker	representation,	perhaps	because	
these	ran	contrary	to	their	adversarial	approach	to	industrial	relations.	
Given	 these	 assumptions,	 and	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 articulation	 of	 the	 argument	 for	
protecting	 the	 wider	 public	 through	 company	 law,	 the	 Committee	 focused	 from	 its	 first	
questionnaire	on	whether	reforms	were	‘necessary	to	safeguard	the	interests	of	shareholders	
or	 minorities	 of	 shareholders’. 109 	Its	 final	 report	 sought	 ‘means	 of	 making	 it	 easier	 for	
shareholders	 to	 exercise	 a	 more	 effective	 general	 control	 over	 the	 management	 of	 their	
companies’.110	The	 justification	 for	 this	was	 the	 ‘illusory	nature	of	 the	control	 theoretically	
exercised	by	shareholders	over	directors’	which	‘has	been	accentuated	by	the	dispersion	of	
capital’.111	While	the	Committee	recognised	that	‘Executive	power	must	inevitably	be	vested	
in	the	directors	and	is	generally	used	to	the	advantage	of	the	shareholders’,112	it	concluded	
that	 it	was	 ‘desirable	 to	give	shareholders	greater	powers	 to	 remove	directors	with	whom	
they	are	dissatisfied,	than	they	have	at	present’.113		
The	Committee	therefore	recommended	a	number	of	changes	which	sought	to	empower	the	
shareholders	 as	 a	means	 of	 countering	 the	 separation	 of	 ‘ownership’	 and	 control.	 First,	 it	
addressed	 shareholder	 meetings,	 which	 were	 viewed	 as	 a	 crucial	 means	 of	 control	 by	
shareholders	over	directors,114	proposing	mandatory	minimum	notice	periods	which	would	
override	the	company’s	articles.115	Second,	the	Committee	recommended	the	introduction	of	
																																								 																				
108	See	Memorandum	by	the	General	Federation	of	Trade	Unions,	Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	
above	n	43,	Appendix	SS,	and,	for	example,	ibid,	para	11274.	
109	Company	Law	Amendment,	Draft	Questionnaire	for	Discussion,	Cohen	Committee	Archive,	CL3,	BT	
146/5	
110	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	5,	emphasis	added	
111	Ibid,	para	7.	The	Committee’s	figures	showed	that,	in	a	sample	of	large	companies,	87.7%	of	the	
shareholders	owned	less	than	300	shares	(ibid,	para	124).	
112	Ibid,	para	124.	
113	Ibid,	para	130.	
114	Ibid,	para	125.	
115	Ibid,	para	126,	implemented	by	s133	CA	1948.	
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mandatory	 rules	 relating	 to	 proxies	 which	 would	 override	 the	 articles	 and	 reduce	 the	
likelihood	of	the	directors	controlling	all	the	proxies.116	Third,	the	Committee	sought	to	make	
it	easier	 for	 shareholders	 to	propose	 resolutions	at	 the	general	meeting,117	recommending	
that	100	members	holding	on	average	not	less	than	£100	of	paid	up	capital	per	member,	or	a	
member	or	members	holding	not	less	than	5	per	cent	of	the	voting	shares,	should	be	entitled	
to	 require	 the	 company	 to	 send	 out,	 albeit	 at	 the	 shareholders’	 expense,	 any	 proposed	
resolution	or	statement.118		
However,	 the	 most	 important	 recommendation	 was	 that	 ‘there	 should	 be	 a	 provision,	
overriding	anything	to	the	contrary	in	the	articles	of	a	company,	that	any	director,	whether	
under	 a	 service	 contract	 or	 not,	 should	 be	 removable	 by	 an	 ordinary	 resolution,	 without	
prejudice	to	any	contractual	right	for	compensation.’119	Whilst	the	Committee	was	aware	that	
the	default	articles	and	contemporary	practice	made	it	very	difficult	for	the	shareholders	to	
remove	 the	 directors,	 there	 is	 virtually	 no	 discussion	 of	 this	 fundamental	 change	 in	 the	
minutes	 of	 the	 evidence	 given	 to	 the	 committee.	 In	 its	 memorandum,	 the	 London	 Stock	
Exchange	 recommended	 that	 the	Companies	Act	 should	 follow	 the	 Stock	 Exchange	 Listing	
Rules	 and	 give	 the	 general	 meeting	 ‘power	 by	 Extraordinary	 Resolution	 to	 remove	 any	
Director	(including	Life	Directors	or	Managing	Director	with	long-term	contracts)	before	the	
expiration	of	his	period	of	his	office’.	120		Cohen	simply	responded	that	‘the	company	should	
																																								 																				
116	Ibid,	paras	132-4,	implemented	by	s136	CA	1948.	
117	Under	Companies	Act	1929,	s114,	shareholders	owning	not	less	than	one	tenth	of	paid	up	capital	
carrying	the	right	to	vote	were	allowed	to	requisition	an	extraordinary	general	meeting,	and	the	
requisition	had	to	state	objects	of	meeting.	Directors	had	to	comply	within	21	days,	failing	which	the	
requisitionists	could	convene	it	themselves,	with	the	company	repaying	their	costs.	This	allowed	
shareholders	to	propose	resolutions,	including	special	resolutions.	However,	the	Committee	
concluded	that	this	power	had	become	‘largely	illusory	because	with	the	great	increase	in	the	number	
of	shareholders	it	has	become	difficult	for	any	single	shareholder,	or	even	for	a	group	of	shareholders,	
to	seek	the	support	of	their	fellow	members’:	see	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	128.	
118	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	128,	implemented	by	s140	CA	1948	with	slight	changes	to	
the	time	periods.	
119	Ibid,	para	130	
120	See	Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	above	n	43,	Appendix	X	at	350.	
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have	that	power	undoubtedly’.121	There	is	no	other	discussion	in	the	reported	proceedings	of	
the	 shareholders	 removing	 the	directors	by	 simple	majority.	An	examination	of	 the	Cohen	
Committee	archive	reveals	that	a	solicitor	called	Stephen	Gordon	suggested	at	an	early	stage	
that		
‘Managements	in	this	country,	at	all	events	have	a	very	strong	sense	of	service	to	the	
entity	which	they	manage	and	they	tend	to	put	the	Company	before	the	shareholders.	
The	interests	are	not	necessarily	identical…	It	is	worth	considering	whether	it	is	not	
possible	to	bring	the	shareholders	into	closer	relation	with	the	Company’s	affairs,	and	
the	following	suggestions	are	made…Shareholders	should	be	entitled,	subject	to	any	
contract,	to	remove	any	Director	by	a	bare	majority	(on	a	poll).’122	
This	suggestion	does	not	appear	to	have	made	an	 immediate	 impact	on	the	Committee.123	
Instead,	 it	was	 resurrected	 at	 a	 relatively	 late	 stage	 of	 the	 Committee’s	 proceedings.	 The	
Association	of	British	Chambers	of	Commerce	opposed	any	‘general	alteration	of	the	existing	
rights	of	shareholders,	since	shareholders	could	ascertain	their	rights	at	the	time	when	they	
subscribed	or	bought	their	shares’.	A	number	of	their	suggestions	intended	to	prevent	abuses	
of	majority	 control124	were	 included	 in	 a	memorandum	 summarising	 principal	 suggestions	
made	 to	 the	 Committee,125	and	 in	 a	memorandum	 for	 consideration	 at	meetings	 in	 early	
August	1944,	which	referred	to	a	suggestion	that	‘all	directors	should	be	subject	to	annual	re-
election’.126	It	is	unclear	where	the	suggestion	of	annual	re-election	of	directors	came	from,	
as	 it	 is	 not	marked	 as	 a	 new	 suggestion,	 and	 there	 is	 no	mention	 of	 it	 in	 any	 intervening	
																																								 																				
121	Ibid,	para	6038.	
122	Cohen	Committee	Archive,	CL	11A	BT	146/5	(submission	of	by	Stephen	Gordon	of	Lawrence,	
Messer	and	Co).	
123	Unfortunately,	the	minutes	of	the	first	thirteen	meetings	of	the	Committee,	BT	146/3	are	missing	
from	the	National	Archives.	
124	Cohen	Committee	Archive,	CL	72,	BT	146/5	
125	Ibid,	CL	102	
126	Ibid,	CL	142	(memorandum	circulated	for	consideration	at	meetings	to	be	held	on	Tuesday	1st	
August	and	Wednesday	August	2nd,	dated	14th	July	1944,	para	11(6)).	
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memoranda.	There	was	no	mention	at	this	stage	of	Stephen	Gordon’s	suggestion.	In	the	event,	
at	its	32nd	meeting,	the	Committee	agreed	that	‘all	directors	should	be	subject	to	annual	re-
election…	except	as	regards	directors	under	service	contracts	which	stipulated	that	they	must	
remain	directors	as	long	as	their	service	contracts	remained	in	force’.127	The	minutes	of	the	
next	 meeting	 record	 the	 abandonment	 of	 annual	 re-election,	 and	 an	 agreement	 ‘to	
recommend	 instead	 that	 shareholders	 should	 be	 given	 the	 power	 to	 remove	 directors,	
including	 directors	 under	 service	 contracts,	 by	 ordinary	 resolution.’128 	The	 provision	 then	
remained	 in	all	 further	drafts	of	 the	report,	supplemented	by	an	annotation	to	the	second	
draft	report	by	Cohen	himself	that	this	would	be	‘without	prejudice	to	any	contractual	right	
for	compensation’	and	making	an	exception	for	a	permanent	director	of	a	private	company	
appointed	before	the	Act	came	into	force	on	the	basis	that	‘this	right	arose	in	substance	as	an	
agreed	matter	of	contract’.129		
Apart	from	the	statement	in	the	final	report	that	shareholders	should	have	greater	powers	to	
remove	directors,	there	is	nothing	in	the	Minutes	of	Evidence	or	the	archive	to	shed	light	on	
how	the	Committee	thought	this	rule	would	impact	on	the	governance	and	management	of	
companies.	 It	 is	clear	that	the	Committee	was	concerned	about	the	impact	of	mergers	and	
amalgamations	on	shareholders.	As	noted	in	section	3(a)	above,	before	1945,	mergers	tended	
to	proceed	consensually.	The	proposer	negotiated	with	the	 incumbent	directors	to	reach	a	
settlement	for	their	 loss	of	office,	 in	the	form	of	either	a	seat	on	the	board	of	the	merged	
company	or	a	compensation	payment.	In	the	case	of	a	seat	on	the	merged	board,	this	was	
often	 a	 long-term	 appointment	 to	 allow	 the	 director	 ‘to	 retain	 some	 control’, 130 	whilst	
																																								 																				
127	Ibid,	BT	146/4	(Minutes	of	32nd	meeting	6/9/44).	
128	Ibid,	(Minutes	of	33rd	meeting	19/9/44,	para	1).	
129	Ibid,	CL187C	[B],	BT	146/11.	
130	Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	above	n	43,	paragraph	10190	(Evidence	of	Samuel	Cash,	partner	in	
Vizards)	
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payments	for	giving	up	directorships	could	amount	to	a	considerable	sum,131	which	the	Cohen	
Committee	 viewed	 as	 a	 diversion	 of	 part	 of	 the	 purchase	 price	 of	 the	 business	 from	 the	
shareholders	 to	 the	 directors. 132 	The	 Committee	 therefore	 recommended	 that	 these	
payments	 should	 be	 approved	 by	 the	 shareholders	 in	 general	 meeting,	 failing	 which	 the	
director	would	be	obliged	to	distribute	the	funds	to	the	shareholders.133	
More	generally,	 the	Committee	was	 clearly	 concerned	 that	 it	was	 very	difficult	 to	 remove	
long-term	 or	 life	 directors	 who	 were	 no	 longer	 competent,	 but	 who	 had	 entrenched	
themselves	 through	 provisions	 in	 the	 articles,	 either	 upon	 foundation	 or	 during	 an	
amalgamation	process,134	an	area	in	which	Cohen	had	practised.135	The	recommendation	to	
make	all	directors	removable	by	ordinary	resolution	certainly	made	it	futile	for	directors	to	
negotiate	long-term	seats	on	the	board	following	a	merger.	However,	the	decision	to	give	the	
shareholders	such	a	strong	power	to	remove	the	directors	went	far	beyond	what	was	required	
to	counter	the	problems	of	 incompetence	and	value	extraction	during	amalgamations,	and	
beyond	what	even	the	Stock	Exchange	considered	was	required	to	give	adequate	protection	
to	shareholders.	Whilst	 the	Committee	probably	did	not	 intend	to	facilitate	changes	 in	the	
control	of	companies	or	hostile	takeovers,	its	repeated	expressions	of	concern	for	the	position	
of	 small	 shareholders,	 focus	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 share	 price	 and	 emphasis	 on	 the	
importance	of	shareholder	control	strongly	suggests	that	it	intended	to	bring	about	a	wider	
																																								 																				
131	Hannah	notes	that	this	could	amount	to	as	much	as	one	tenth	of	the	purchase	price:	L	Hannah,	
‘Takeover	Bids	in	Britain	Before	1950:	An	Exercise	in	Business	“Pre-History”’	(1974)	16	Business	
History	65,	72.	
132	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	92.	
133	Ibid.	Ultimately	s193	CA	1948	introduced	a	rule	requiring	directors	to	disclose	to,	and	obtain	
approval	from,	the	general	meeting	for	any	payment	made	to	them	‘by	way	of	compensation	for	loss	
of	office,	or	as	consideration	for	or	in	connection	with	his	retirement	from	office’.	Failure	to	comply	
would	result	in	the	director	holding	the	payment	on	trust	for	shareholders	who	sold	their	shares.		
134	See	for	example	the	observation	of	Professor	Goodhart	that	‘it	is	possible…	for	directors	to	
continue	in	office	longer	than	may	be	desirable’	(Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	above	n	43,	paras	
5257	and	9481).	Cohen	pointed	out	that	removal	of	life	directors	would	require	at	the	very	least	an	
extraordinary	resolution	(ibid,	para	5148).	See	also	the	representations	from	the	London	Stock	
Exchange	(ibid,	para	6185)	and	Cohen	Committee	Archive,	CL108A,	BT	146/5.		
135	Minutes	of	evidence	(1943-44)	above	n	43,	para	10194.	
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shift	in	power	from	directors	to	shareholders.136	At	no	point	did	the	Committee	ever	discuss	
the	 impact	 of	 this	 regulatory	 change	on	 the	professional	managers	who	were	 increasingly	
dominating	operational	decision-making	within	companies.	
Nor	did	the	provision	implementing	the	recommendation	generate	significant	controversy	in	
Parliament.	 In	 the	second	 reading	of	 the	Companies	Bill	 in	 the	House	of	 Lords,	Sir	Richard	
Stafford	Cripps,	President	of	the	Board	of	Trade	and	a	Labour	politician	stated	that	it	was	a	
‘large	 and	 rather	 complicated-looking	 piece	 of	 legislation’	 which	 was	 ‘non-contentious…	
certainly	 from	 the	 party	 point	 of	 view.’	 He	 emphasised	 that	 amendment	 was	 ‘urgently	
necessary’	because	‘the	relationship	between	management	and	ownership	in	limited	liability	
companies	has	tended	progressively	to	be	more	and	more	shadowy’.137	He	emphasised	the	
role	of	the	accounting	reforms	in	assisting	shareholders	to	understand	their	position,	and	a	
number	of	other	measures	enabling	‘shareholders	to	play	a	real	part	as	owners’,	although	he	
did	not	refer	to	the	mandatory	power	of	removal.138	In	debates,	one	speaker	appears	to	have	
confused	ordinary	and	extraordinary	resolutions,139	whilst	another	erroneously	thought	that	
the	1929	Act	provided	for	removal	by	extraordinary	resolution.140	There	was	some	concern	
that	minorities	might	use	the	power	to	‘interfere	too	much	with	the	proper	conduct	of	the	
companies'	 business	 by	 threatening	 arbitrary	 resolutions’, 141 	but	 the	 most	 vehement	
opposition	 came	 from	Viscount	Maugham,	who	 argued	 that	 this	was	 a	 change	 ‘of	 a	most	
revolutionary	kind,	and	that	 its	effect	would	be	 likely	to	cause	a	great	deal,	of	harm	in	the	
ordinary	 day-to-day	work	 of	 companies.’142	However,	 his	main	 concern	was	 the	 ‘obloquy’	
																																								 																				
136	As	Horace	Samuel,	who	gave	evidence	to	the	Committee	but	did	not	discuss	removal	of	directors,	
put	it	in	his	1933	book,	‘Directorates	thus	tend	to	constitute	the	vested	interest	of	a	group,	and	being	
a	vested	interest,	are	almost	as	difficult	to	dislodge	as	the	pocket-boroughs	of	the	eighteenth	
century.’	H	Samuel,	Shareholders’	Money	(London:	Pitman,	1933)	p	120.	
137	Hansard,	HC	Deb,	vol	438,	col	585-6,	6	June	1947.	
138	ibid,	col	588.	
139	ibid,	col	642	(Eric	Fletcher,	MP)	
140	Hansard,	HL	Deb,	vol	146,	col	969,	1	April	1947	(Viscount	Maugham)	
141	Hansard,	HC	Deb,	vol	438,	col	619,	6	June	1947	(Sir	Hugh	Lucas-Tooth,	MP)	
142	Hansard,	HL	Deb,	vol	145,	col	862,	24	February	1947		
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which	would	be	suffered	by	a	director	who	was	proposed	to	be	removed,	whereas	‘the	whole	
point	 about	 the	 three-quarters	 majority	 is	 that	 so	 large	 a	 majority	 as	 that	 will	 never	 be	
obtained	unless	there	is	some	real	reason	for	the	removal	of	a	director.’143	He	also	questioned	
the	logic	of	overruling	companies’	articles	rather	than	allowing	a	company	‘to	make	up	its	own	
mind	on	the	subject’,144	and	noting	the	Law	Society’s	opposition	to	the	amendment	on	the	
basis	that	it	would	‘have	a	most	injurious	effect	on	the	shareholders	who	form	a	minority.’145	
In	the	end,	the	recommendation	was	embodied	in	s184	CA	1948,	with	a	longer	notice	period	
of	28	days	to	ensure	that	there	was	‘no	snap	question	about	this’	and	an	opportunity	for	the	
director	to	make	representations.146		
It	is	perhaps	surprising	that	this	rule	was	introduced	by	a	Labour	government.	Maltby	explains	
that	Labour	was	committed	to	‘the	creation	of	a	new	institutional	framework	to	increase	social	
control	rather	than	investors’	control	of	companies’	and,	being	focused	on	nationalisation	of	
quasi-monopolies,	did	not	engage	with	the	process	of	companies	 legislation.147	In	addition,	
the	development	of	the	welfare	state	may	have	prevented	the	Labour	Party	from	worrying	
about	 the	 social	 implications	 of	 changes	 in	 shareholder	 rights	 and,	 subsequently,	 the	
emergence	of	the	hostile	takeover.148		
Perhaps	because	it	was	included	in	a	couple	of	lines	buried	in	the	middle	of	paragraph	130,	
entitled	 ‘Election	 of	 Directors’,	 the	 proposal	 was	 barely	 noted	 in	 contemporary	 academic	
																																								 																				
143	Ibid,	col	872	
144	Ibid	col	863	
145	Ibid	col	865	
146	Hansard,	HL	Deb,	vol	146,	col	727-8,	25	March	1947;	HC	Deb,	vol	441,	col	194-5,	28	July	1947;	HL	
Deb,	vol	151	col	955-75,	5	August	1947.		
147	Maltby	(2000)	above	n	95,	pp	47	and	54.	
148	As	Bruner	puts	it,	‘stronger	social	welfare	protection…	permitted	the	UK	corporate	governance	
system	to	focus	more	intently	on	shareholders	without	precipitating	social	backlash’	(C	Bruner,	
Corporate	Governance	in	the	Common	Law	World	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2013)	p	143).	For	detailed	
discussion	of	the	Labour	Party’s	evolving	approach	to	takeovers	and	mergers	during	the	1960s	and	
1970s,	see	ibid	at	151-60.	It	was	only	during	the	1980s,	with	the	rolling	back	of	many	of	those	
reforms,	as	well	as	the	weakening	of	trade	unions,	that	those	social	consequences	became	clearer.	
We	are	grateful	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	suggesting	this	point.		
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commentary.	 Kahn-Freund,	 for	 example,	 saw	 the	 ‘divorce	 between	 financial	 interest	 and	
power	 of	 management’	 as	 ‘a	 fact…	 which	 is	 inherent	 in	 the	 technical	 and	 organization	
evolution	 of	 capitalist	 society’	 against	which	 an	 Act	 of	 Parliament	was	 ‘useless’.149	Dodd’s	
review	of	the	Report	did	not	even	refer	to	it,150	whilst	a	1951	analysis	simply	noted	that	‘the	
report	is	conservative’	and	that	the	Committee	‘refrained	from	recommending	fundamental	
alterations	of	the	law’.151	Gower	wrote	approvingly	of	the	change	in	1956	in	dealing	with	one	
of	 the	 ‘vital	 corporate	 problems	 of	 the	 century’,	 that	 is,	 ‘the	 control	 of	 stockholders	 over	
management’,	and	contrasting	it	favourably	with	the	position	in	many	US	states.152	However,	
like	 the	 Committee,	 none	 of	 these	 commentators	 appears	 to	 have	 anticipated	 the	 full	
implications	of	this	change.		
This	 provision,	 which	 represented	 a	 deliberate	 policy	 decision	 to	 interfere	 in	 contractual	
allocations	of	rights,	transformed	the	balance	of	power	within	companies.	It	gave	the	majority	
in	general	meeting	full	control	of	the	composition	of	the	board	for	the	first	time,	and	so	shifted	
ultimate	control	of	the	direction	of	the	company	from	the	board	(and,	often,	the	management)	
to	the	general	meeting,	which	came	to	be	viewed	as	the	ultimate	controller	of	the	company’s	
assets	because	of	its	power	to	‘hire	and	fire’	the	directors.153	It	strengthened	the	position	of	
those	who	argued	that	the	board	of	directors	was	the	representative	of	the	shareholders,	and	
																																								 																				
149	O	Kahn-Freund,	‘Company	Law	Reform:	A	Review	of	The	Report	of	The	Committee	on	Company	
Law	Amendment’	(1946)	9	Modern	Law	Review	235,	245	
150	EM	Dodd,	‘Review:	Report	of	the	Committee	on	Company	Law	Amendment’	(1945)	58	Harvard	
Law	Review	1258	
151	AB	Levy,	Private	Corporations	and	Their	Control	Vol	I	(Oxford:	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul,	1950)	p	
167.	
152	LCB	Gower,	‘Some	Contrasts	Between	British	and	American	Corporation	Law’	(1956)	69	Harvard	
Law	Review	1369,	1381,	1389-90	and	1396.	However,	he	did	not	explicitly	link	the	emergence	of	
takeovers	to	s184	CA	1948.	As	Bruner	(2013,	above	n	148,	p	148)	notes,	Cohen	himself,	in	a	1957	
lecture,	appears	to	have	recognised	that	his	committee’s	reforms	‘contributed	to	the	rise	of	hostile	
takeovers’,	although	he	did	not	explicitly	refer	to	the	contribution	of	the	removal	power.	
153	LCB	Gower,	‘Corporate	Control:	the	Battle	for	the	Berkeley’	(1955)	Harvard	Law	Review	1176,	
1185-6.	
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weakened	advocates	of	the	real	entity	approach,	who	emphasised	the	company	as	a	separate	
legal	entity,	and	its	long-term	interests	as	the	touchstone	for	good	management.154	
However,	its	most	important	effect	was	that	it	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	the	hostile	
takeover,	because	it	allowed	outsiders,	for	the	first	time,	to	make	offers	‘over	the	heads	of	
the	 Boards	 concerned’, 155 	with	 a	 considerable	 degree	 of	 confidence	 that	 they	 would	 be	
successful	and	certain	that,	having	acquired	control	of	the	general	meeting,	they	would	be	
able	 to	 replace	 the	 directors	 (and	 with	 them,	 the	 senior	 management).	 From	 the	 1950s	
onwards,	the	argument	that	management	should	balance	competing	interests	at	stake	in	the	
company	was	rarely	heard,	as	the	focus	shifted	to	prioritising	the	interests	of	shareholders.	
	
5.	THE	EMERGENCE	OF	THE	HOSTILE	TAKEOVER	IN	THE	1950s	
In	the	early	1950s,	shortly	after	the	implementation	of	the	Cohen	Committee’s	reforms,	the	
first	wave	of	hostile	takeovers	struck	British	companies.156	Indeed,	between	1948	and	1961,	
25	per	cent	of	companies	quoted	on	the	London	Stock	Exchange	were	taken	over	by	other	
quoted	companies.157	However,	the	takeover	did	not	 just	operate	as	a	viable	alternative	to	
the	consensual	merger	after	1948.	It	also	operated	as	a	transaction	aimed	at	gaining	a	purely	
financial	advantage	for	the	bidder.	Although	some	takeovers	were	carried	out	for	industrial	
reasons,	many	takeovers	during	the	1950s	and	1960s	were	financially	motivated,	as	bidders	
sought	 to	 gain	 control	 of	 companies	 and	 remove	 the	 board	 in	 order	 to	 access	 reserves,	
																																								 																				
154	However,	this	approach	to	management	appears	to	have	persisted	among	those	managers	in	a	
Northern	City	interviewed	by	Nichols	in	1961-2:	see	Nichols	(1969)	above	n	38,	Chapter	17.	
155	This	was	the	Bank	of	England’s	working	definition	of	a	takeover	from	1959,	included	in	‘Take-over	
Bids,	Note	of	meeting	at	Bank	of	England	on	Friday	10	July	1959’,	cited	in	R	Roberts,	‘Regulatory	
Responses	to	the	Market	for	Corporate	Control	in	Britain	in	the	1950s’	(1992)	34	Business	History	183,	
184.	
156	Charles	Clore	launched	the	first	hostile	takeover	bids	in	1953	for	the	Savoy	Hotel	and	Sears:	see	D	
Chambers,	‘The	City	and	the	Corporate	Economy	since	1970’	in	R	Floud,	J	Humphries	and	P	Johnson	
(eds),	The	Cambridge	Economic	History	of	Modern	Britain,	Volume	2	(Cambridge:	CUP,	2014)	p	267.		
157	Hannah	(1974)	above	n	131,	p	67.	
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liquidate	undervalued	assets	or	gain	tax	advantages.	 It	 is	no	exaggeration	to	state	that	the	
Companies	Act	1948	ushered	in	the	modern	era	of	financialised,	shareholder	value	corporate	
governance.	
What	effect	did	the	Companies	Act	1948	have?	Before	its	introduction,	there	were	significant	
obstacles	to	takeover	bids	which	bypassed	the	board	of	directors	and	were	addressed	directly	
to	the	shareholders.	The	bidder	had	to	offer	a	very	high	price	so	that	the	directors	could	not	
say	that	the	bid	was	inadequate.	Shareholders,	who	had	little	reliable	information	about	the	
company’s	 financial	 position,	 tended	 to	 follow	 the	 recommendation	of	 the	directors	 as	 to	
whether	 to	 accept	 a	 bid	 from	 an	 outsider.158	More	 significantly,	 there	was	 a	 fundamental	
asymmetry	between	incumbent	directors,	who	only	had	to	control	–	directly	or	through	other	
supportive	 shareholders	–	25%	of	 the	 shares	 in	order	 to	prevent	a	bid	which	would	make	
changes	of	which	they	did	not	approve,	and	bidders,	who	had	to	acquire	75%	of	the	shares	to	
take	control	of	the	general	meeting	and	change	the	board.	As	a	result,	consensual	mergers	
were	the	norm,	and	hostile	takeovers	were	virtually	unheard	of.	Where	they	did	occur,	they	
were	motivated	by	an	industrial,	and	generally	anticompetitive,	logic.159		
Before	1948,	it	would	technically	have	been	possible	for	a	takeover	bidder	who	had	merely	
acquired	 a	majority	 of	 the	 shares	 to	 gain	 control	 of	 the	 board	 by	 refusing	 to	 re-elect	 the	
incumbents	 during	 two	 rounds	 of	 annual	 retirements.160	This,	 however,	 would	 have	 been	
unacceptable	 to	 a	 hypothetical	 bidder,	 as	 the	 incumbents	would	 remain	 in	 control	 of	 the	
company’s	 decision-making	 during	 that	 period,	 potentially	 taking	 decisions	 adverse	 to	 the	
interests	of	the	new	controlling	shareholder,	and	any	challenge	would	require	long,	expensive	
																																								 																				
158	See	JB	Tabb,	Accountancy	Aspects	of	the	Takeover	Bids	in	Britain	1945-1965	(Unpublished	PhD	
Thesis,	University	of	Sheffield,	1968)	p	10;	Hannah	(1974)	above	n	131,	p	71	
159	See	Tabb	(1968)	above	n	158,	p	11.	In	1906,	Lever	exceptionally	launched	hostile	bids	for	a	number	
of	his	competitors	who	had	refused	to	form	a	cartel	with	him,	and	another	hostile	bid	was	launched	
by	John	Knight	Ltd	in	1920.	
160	In	Guinnane	et	al’s	1892	sample	only	one	company	required	all	directors	to	stand	for	re-election	at	
each	annual	meeting:	see	Guinnane	et	al	(2017)	above	n	57,	p	243.	
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and	 uncertain	 litigation.	 Any	 bidder	 relying	 on	 leverage	 would	 have	 faced	 even	 greater	
difficulty.	Whilst	directors	might	have	stood	down	 ‘voluntarily’	 in	 the	event	of	a	change	of	
control	of	the	general	meeting,	there	is	simply	no	evidence	of	this	type	of	change	of	control	
occurring	before	1948.	Instead,	changes	of	control	tended	to	result	in	directors	retaining	their	
positions, 161 	or	 being	 paid	 to	 give	 up	 their	 positions,	 an	 issue	 about	 which	 the	 Cohen	
Committee	expressed	concern.162	Similarly,	a	new	controlling	shareholder	might	have	relied	
on	 the	 articles,	 which	 provided	 a	 default	 power	 for	 the	 general	 meeting	 to	 increase	 the	
number	of	directors	by	ordinary	 resolution,	 to	appoint	 a	number	of	new	directors	 to	 take	
control	of	the	board.163	However,	bespoke	provisions	would	normally	have	made	this	fruitless.	
For	example,	many	companies	provided	for	the	appointment	of	a	managing	director	who	did	
not	have	 to	 stand	 for	 re-election	by	 rotation,	either	 for	a	 fixed	 term	or	 indefinitely.164	The	
courts	 enforced	 articles	 giving	 broad	 powers	 to	 managing	 directors,	 even	 where	 this	
effectively	gave	them	a	veto	over	board	decisions,	and	so	increasing	the	size	of	the	board	in	
accordance	with	the	articles	would	not	have	allowed	a	new	majority	controller	to	take	control	
of	management	 from	a	managing	director	without	altering	 the	articles	 (which	would	have	
required	75%).165	Hence,	being	appointed	as	a	managing	director	would	allow	a	director	to	
																																								 																				
161	Franks	et	al	(2005),	above	n	55.		
162	Cohen	Report	(1945)	above	n	93,	para	92.	
163	See	e.g.	Companies	Act	1929,	Table	A,	Art	77;	Companies	Act	1906,	Table	A,	Art	83;	Companies	Act	
1862,	Table	A,	Art	63.	
164	Guinnane	et	al	(2017)	above	n	57,	p	244.	Similarly,	many	companies	provided	that	anyone	seeking	
the	office	of	director,	except	retiring	directors	or	those	chosen	by	the	board,	had	to	provide	advance	
notice,	potentially	giving	the	directors	‘time	to	line	up	the	votes	to	block	anyone	whom	they	did	not	
favour	from	securing	a	seat	on	the	board’:	see	ibid.	
165	Clauses	in	the	articles	requiring	consent	of	managing	directors	to	particular	decisions	were	
enforced	at	the	instance	of	a	shareholder-director	in	Quin	&	Axtens,	Ltd	v	Salmon	[1909]	AC	442.	This	
effectively	limited	the	powers	of	the	board,	because	as	Lord	Loreburn	put	it,	‘the	directors	cannot	
manage	it	in	a	particular	way	–	that	is	to	say,	they	cannot	do	certain	things	if	Mr.	Salmon	or	Mr.	
Axtens	objects’	(ibid,	443).		
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‘perpetuate	their	power	indefinitely’,166	and	the	courts	were	content	to	allow	this	to	happen	
in	the	name	of	managerial	continuity.167	
Proxy	contests	akin	to	those	by	which	transfers	of	corporate	control	occur	in	Delaware	never	
emerged	 in	 the	 UK	 either,	 168 	probably	 because	 this	 approach	 would	 have	 entailed	
considerable	 risk	 for	 the	 would-be	 controller.	 First,	 before	 1948,	 the	 directors	 tended	 to	
control	all	 the	proxies,	with	shareholders	very	passive,	making	any	attempt	to	 identify	and	
lobby	the	shareholders	at	 the	very	 least	time-consuming	and	expensive,	and	perhaps	even	
impossible,	 given	 widespread	 use	 of	 nominees	 and	 no	 requirement	 to	 disclose	 beneficial	
ownership.	Second,	any	attempt	to	remove	directors	entrenched	by	the	articles	would	have	
required	a	75%	majority,	and	would	potentially	have	resulted	in	litigation.	The	inevitable	delay	
and	uncertainty	surrounding	any	attempt	to	take	control	of	the	board,	as	well	as	the	cost	and	
uncertainty	of	litigation	to	challenge	managerial	decisions	taken	in	the	interim,	would	have	
been	sufficient	to	deter	most	would-be	bidders.	Even	if	banks	had	been	willing	to	lend,	this	
would,	in	most	cases,	have	ruled	out	using	borrowed	money	to	fund	the	acquisition	of	shares.		
By	levelling	the	playing	field	between	incumbents	and	outsiders,	the	1948	changes	radically	
altered	 the	 prospects	 of	 hostile	 takeovers,	 making	 it	 much	 more	 difficult	 for	 company	
directors	 to	 resist,	 and	opened	up	 a	wider	 range	of	 companies	 to	 hostile	 takeover.	 In	 the	
period	from	1948	until	the	introduction	of	the	City	Code	in	1968,	the	ability	to	take	control	of	
a	 company	 by	 obtaining	 a	 simple	majority	 of	 the	 shares	was	 a	 fundamental	 driver	 of	 the	
emergence	of	the	hostile	takeover.	Whilst	shareholders	generally	may	have	been	dispersing,	
Hannah’s	 research	 in	 relation	 to	 listed	 companies,	 noted	 above,	 shows	 that	 directors	 and	
other	 founders	 normally	 controlled	 around	 one	 third	 of	 the	 shares,	 with	 the	 directors	
																																								 																				
166	Guinnane	et	al	(2017)	above	n	57,	p	244.	
167	In	the	Court	of	Appeal	decision	in	Quin	&	Axtens,	Farwell	LJ	considered	the	provision	in	the	articles	
to	be	‘a	most	usual	and	proper	requirement,	because	a	business	does	require	a	head	to	look	after	it,	
and	a	head	that	shall	not	be	interfered	with	unnecessarily’.	The	effect	was	that	‘to	oust	the	directors,	
a	special	resolution	would	be	required’:	see	[1909]	1	Ch	311,	319.	
168	For	discussion,	see	Bruner	(2013)	above	n	148,	pp	39-40	and	208-9.		
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themselves	often	controlling	around	25%.169	This,	of	course,	was	sufficient	to	maintain	control	
under	the	default	–	and	normally	adopted	–	rules	of	Table	A.	Once	the	law	was	changed,	the	
incumbents	 had	 to	 win	 around	 sufficient	 additional	 shareholders	 to	 create	 an	 absolute	
majority.	The	new	institutional	shareholders,	presented	with	the	prospect	of	a	capital	gain,	
would	 be	 unlikely	 to	 side	with	 the	 incumbents.	 Effectively,	 contests	 for	 corporate	 control	
became	a	race	to	50%.		
Bidders	could	build	up	significant	shareholdings	through	on-market	acquisitions	via	a	nominee,	
and	it	was	very	difficult	for	the	directors	to	find	out	about	this.170	In	a	number	of	cases,	bidders	
built	up	positions	of	20-25%,	giving	them	a	significant	chance	of	acquiring	a	majority	of	the	
shares	when	they	eventually	launched	a	bid.171	Bidders	could	also	use	various	coercive	tactics	
to	 put	 pressure	 on	 shareholders	 to	 tender.	 These	 included	making	 partial	 bids	 or	 bids	 for	
limited	quantities	of	shares,172	offering	bonuses	for	early	acceptance,173	and	declaring	offers	
unconditional	without	disclosing	the	number	of	acceptances.174	These	tactics	played	on	the	
fear	 of	 shareholders	 that	 if	 they	 did	 not	 tender,	 they	 would	 be	 locked	 in	 as	 minority	
shareholders,	vulnerable	to	opportunistic	value	extraction	by	the	new	controllers,175	or	forced	
to	accept	a	 lower	price	for	their	shares	when	they	eventually	sold.	Bidders	amplified	those	
																																								 																				
169	Hannah	(2007)	above	n	8.	
170	ss95	and	98	CA	1929	required	companies	to	maintain	and	make	public	a	register	of	members.	
However,	s101	provided	that	trusts	of	shares	did	not	have	to	be	entered	on	the	register,	making	it	
difficult	to	identify	beneficial	ownership.	The	Cohen	Committee	made	proposals	to	require	nominee	
shareholdings	to	be	indicated	and	beneficial	interests	of	more	than	1%	to	be	disclosed	(above	n	93,	
paras	78	to	81),	but	these	recommendations	did	not	become	law.		
171	As	in	the	bids	by	Daily	Mirror	for	Amalgamated	Press	in	1958	and	Viyella	International	for	Jersey	
Kapwood	in	1966:	see	Tabb	(1968)	above	n	158,	p	191.	
172	ibid,	at	188,	identifying	at	least	13	partial	bids	between	1948	and	1965.	For	example,	in	its	bid	for	
Drake	&	Mount,	Longman	only	offered	to	buy	the	first	10,000	shares	tendered.	There	was	no	
regulation	of	partial	bids	until	the	introduction	of	the	City	Code	in	1968.	
173	As	in	the	bid	of	Westminster	Bank	for	Diners’	Club	Ltd	in	1965:	see	ibid	at	189	
174	As	in	the	1961	bid	by	City	Centre	Properties	Ltd	for	Manchester	Royal	Exchange:	see	ibid	at	192.	
The	Revised	Notes	of	1963	required	the	bidder	to	disclose	the	level	of	acceptances,	but	this	rule	was	
subsequently	broken	by	British	Oxygen	which	declared	its	bid	for	Murex	unconditional	but	delayed	
disclosure	of	the	level	of	acceptances	by	six	hours:	ibid	at	262.	
175	Bull	and	Vice	show	how,	provided	they	acted	in	good	faith,	a	majority	shareholder	could	then	use	
their	control	to	withdraw	surplus	cash	from	the	company	by	selling	assets	to	it:	G	Bull	&	A	Vice,	Bid	for	
Power	(London,	Elek,	3rd	ed,	1961)	p	227.	The	shareholder’s	‘sell	out’	right	was	not	introduced	until	
1986.	
38	
	
fears	 by	 threatening	 to	 implement	 a	 ‘conservative’	 or	 ‘prudent’	 dividend	policy	 once	 they	
acquired	control,176	whilst	media	reports	of	successful	bidders	reducing	the	dividend	following	
acquisition	served	as	a	further	warning	to	shareholders	who	were	considering	not	tendering	
their	shares.177		
The	emergence	of	these	practices	presented	incumbent	directors,	who	normally	had	a	large	
amount	of	personal	wealth	tied	up	in	shares,	with	a	dilemma,	as	the	advent	of	a	hostile	bid	
threatened	to	turn	them	into	minority	shareholders,	and	also	created	a	significant	risk	that	
they	would	be	removed	from	their	positions	as	directors	(otherwise	the	bid	would	not	have	
been	hostile).178	They	knew	that,	 if	 the	bid	was	successful	and	they	had	refused	to	tender,	
they	would	be	forced	to	accept	whatever	price	the	new	controller	offered	them,	or	to	remain	
as	a	potentially	oppressed	minority	shareholder.179	Beyond	this,	 incumbents	who	were	not	
willing	to	sell	their	shares	had	three	courses	of	action	open	to	them,	none	of	them	simple.	
																																								 																				
176	See	for	example	the	bid	by	Broadmead	for	Murdoch	&	Co	in	1957	or	the	1958	bid	by	Reynolds	for	
British	Aluminium,	in	which	Reynolds	warned	shareholders	publicly	that	it	was	close	to	gaining	
control,	and	that	once	it	had	control	of	the	company,	it	would	instate	a	‘prudent’	dividend	policy	
(Tabb	(1968)	above	n	158,	p	60).	
177	In	1963,	Courtaulds	took	control	of	Bairns-Wear	Ltd	and	cut	the	dividend	from	10%	to	5%:	see	ibid	
at	246.	
178	From	a	sample	of	forty-five	takeovers	between	1947	and	1960	(which	did	not	distinguish	between	
voluntary	and	involuntary	takeovers),	Singh	found	that	‘around	half’	of	the	directors	of	the	acquired	
company	were	dismissed	within	two	years	of	the	takeover,	but	that	‘the	incidence	of	dismissal	seems	
on	the	whole	to	have	little	relationship	either	to	the	size	or	the	profitability	of	the	acquired	firm’.	A.	
Singh,	Takeovers:	their	Relevance	to	the	Stock	Market	and	the	Theory	of	the	Firm	(Cambridge:	CUP,	
1971)	p	149.	These	figures	form	a	marked	contrast	to	the	findings	of	Franks	et	al	(2005,	above	n	55)	in	
relation	to	takeovers	between	1919	and	1939.We	are	unaware	of	any	quantitative	study	of	director	
removal	during	the	UK	1960s	takeover	wave,	but	indirect	support	for	the	development	of	a	new	
threat	to	the	position	of	directors	and	management	can	be	found	in	the	growth	of	structural	
defensive	measures	between	1950	and	1965,	a	dynamic	which	came	to	an	end	as	institutional	
investors	mounted	opposition	to	this	(ibid	p	603,	Table	10.8),	as	well	as	the	post-bid	defensive	
measures	in	companies	such	as	the	Savoy	Hotel,	and	those	which	came	before	the	courts	in	Hogg	v	
Cramphorn	Ltd	[1967]	Ch	254.	By	the	1980s,	board	removal	appears	to	have	been	routine	following	a	
hostile	takeover:	in	a	study	of	hostile	takeovers	in	the	UK	from	1985-6,	Franks	and	Mayer	found	that	
90	percent	of	directors	were	replaced	within	two	years	of	the	bid,	whilst	for	accepted	bids	the	figure	
was	50	percent:	J	Franks	and	C	Mayer,	‘Hostile	Takeovers	and	the	Correction	of	Managerial	Failure’	
(1996)	40	Journal	of	Financial	Economics	163,	167-8.		
179	This	appears	to	have	happened	for	the	first	time	in	the	takeover	by	Fraser	of	Binns	in	1953.	The	
directors	held	29%	of	the	shares,	preventing	Fraser	from	using	the	squeeze	out	rules	(s209	CA	1948	
required	the	bidder	to	have	acquired	90%	of	the	shares),	but	they	capitulated	once	Fraser	acquired	a	
majority	of	the	shares,	and	sold	their	shares	to	him	at	the	lower	price	of	his	first	bid:	see	Bull	and	Vice	
(1961)	above	n	175,	pp	109-110.		
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They	 could	 try	 and	 take	 defensive	 measures,180 	but	 these	 were	 circumscribed,	 first,	 to	 a	
considerable	degree,	by	the	courts	and,	later,	completely,	by	the	City	Code	on	Takeovers.181	
Second,	they	could	try	to	persuade	the	shareholders	not	to	sell	their	shares	by	increasing	the	
dividend,	which	increased	the	share	price,	but	reduced	the	funds	available	for	reinvestment	
in	the	business,	and	therefore	also	managerial	autonomy,	or	by	taking	actions	similar	to	that	
of	a	bidder,	such	as	selling	off	the	company’s	freeholds	to	an	insurance	company	and	leasing	
them	back.182	Third,	they	could	launch	their	own	bid	for	control	of	the	majority	of	the	shares	
if	they	had,	or	could	obtain,	sufficient	funds,183	or	they	could	persuade	a	friendlier	company	
(which	might	let	them	retain	their	place	on	the	board)	to	bid	for	the	company.	Fourth,	they	
could	 ‘render	 themselves	 irremovable	 without	 their	 own	 consent’	 by	 issuing	 non-voting	
shares,	 a	practice	which	was	 ‘designed	 to	 frustrate	 takeovers’,	 and,	by	1962,	had	 recently	
‘become	a	major	issue’.184	As	directors	focused	on	the	threat	of	takeover	and	increasing	the	
																																								 																				
180	The	directors	of	the	Savoy	Hotel	Ltd	appear	to	have	been	the	first	to	have	tried	this:	see	ibid,	pp	
29-46.	
181	For	discussion	of	the	scope	of	defensive	measures	under	common	law	and	under	the	City	Code,	
see	A	Johnston,	‘Takeover	Regulation:	Historical	and	Theoretical	Perspectives	on	the	City	Code’	(2007)	
66	Cambridge	Law	Journal	422.	One	further	possibility	was	to	give	the	directors	weighted	voting	
rights	on	a	resolution	to	remove	them,	as	permitted	by	the	case	of	Bushell	v	Faith	(1970)	1	All	ER	53.	
However,	there	is	no	evidence	that	this	mechanism	was	used	in	the	UK	as	a	pre-emptive	defence	
against	hostile	takeovers.	If	adopted	on	incorporation,	this	would	reflect	the	agreement	between	the	
founders	(and	indeed	such	clauses	are	widely	understood	as	a	means	of	protecting	agreements	within	
quasi-partnership	companies),	but	it	would	be	difficult	to	introduce	such	a	clause	after	listing,	as	this	
would	require	a	special	resolution	to	alter	the	articles,	and	institutional	shareholders	would	be	
strongly	opposed	to	a	measure	that	would	entrench	board	members.	This	hostility	can	be	seen	from	
their	opposition	to	the	use	of	non-voting	shares,	which	were	used	for	a	brief	period	as	a	defensive	
measure	during	the	1950s	and	1960s,	but	were	gradually	eliminated	by	strong	opposition	from	
institutional	investors	and	disapproval	from	the	stock	exchange	(Franks	et	al	(2005)	above	n	55,	p	
604).	This	hostility	presumably	explains	why	multiple	voting	rights	are	legally	permissible	but	rarely	
seen	in	practice	in	UK	listed	companies	(see	J	Armour,	S	Deakin,	V	Mollica	and	M	Siems,	‘Law	and	
Financial	Development:	What	we	are	Learning	from	Time-Series	Evidence’	(2009)	6	BYU	L	Review	
1435,	1459	fn	87,	noting	that	there	was	‘no	legal	or	regulatory	prohibition	of	multiple	voting	rights’	
between	1970	and	2005).	
182	In	1960,	British	Drug	Houses	responded	to	a	bid	by	doubling	its	dividend,	whilst	in	1962,	Waterlow	
&	Sons	Ltd	responded	by	selling	off	its	head	office	and	distributing	the	proceeds	to	shareholders:	see	
Tabb	(1968)	above	n	158,	pp	61-2.		
183	The	first	example	of	this	appears	to	be	the	contested	takeover	in	1955	of	Millspaugh	by	Hadfields.	
The	rival	bidder	was	defeated	once	Hadfields	obtained	a	majority	of	the	shares.	See	Bull	and	Vice	
(1961)	above	n	175,	pp	166-183.	
184	Report	of	the	Company	Law	Committee	(Cmnd	1749,	June	1962),	Note	of	Dissent,	paras	6	and	9	
(Jenkins	Committee).	
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share	price,	the	idea	that	the	role	of	management	was	to	balance	competing	interests	and	to	
foster	innovation	largely	disappeared	from	public	debate	after	1948.		
Beyond	s184,	a	number	of	other	drivers	of	the	emergence	of	the	hostile	takeover	in	the	early	
1950s	have	been	identified.	Hannah’s	‘tentative	explanation’	for	the	failure	of	the	hostile	bid	
to	emerge	sooner	was	the	poor	quality	of	accounting	information	before	1948,	and	it	was	only	
following	 the	 accounting	 reforms	 that	 bidders	 could	 gain	 access	 to	 reliable	 accounting	
information	without	the	cooperation	of	the	target.185	Those	changes	also	made	shareholders	
less	dependent	on	the	advice	given	to	them	by	the	directors,	who	had	less	of	an	informational	
advantage	than	previously.186	Taxation	played	a	role	too,	with	company	directors,	in	the	face	
of	 rising	 taxes	 on	 profits,	 dramatically	 reducing	 distributions	 to	 shareholders	 in	 order	 to	
‘maintain	an	adequate	flow	of	funds	for	their	businesses’,	depressing	share	prices		and	making	
companies	with	large	quantities	of	liquid	assets	more	attractive	to	bidders.	At	the	same	time,	
bids	were	attractive	to	shareholders	because,	by	selling	their	shares,	they	could	obtain	a	tax-
free	capital	gain	rather	than	dividends	which	were	subject	to	income	tax	at	very	high	levels.187	
Similarly,	as	private	individuals	sold	their	shares	during	the	1950s	and	1960s	to	institutions,	
dispersal	of	shares	increased,	creating	a	necessary	condition	for	the	emergence	of	the	hostile	
bidder	who	sought	to	buy	control	on	the	market	rather	than	through	a	private	acquisition	of	
a	controlling	stake.	Moreover,	 the	rapid	growth	 in	 institutional	 investment	 from	the	1950s	
onwards	ensured	that	bidders	were	increasingly	approaching	fund	managers	who	were	not	
aligned	 with	 management,	 but	 who	 tended	 to	 be	 passive	 in	 matters	 of	 corporate	
																																								 																				
185	Hannah	(1974)	above	n	131,	pp	69-71	and	75.	
186	Ibid	at	70-1	
187	Bull	and	Vice	(1961)	above	n	175,	pp	16-18.	For	details	of	marginal	tax	rates	of	top	rate	taxpayers	
during	this	period,	see	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	p	342.	
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governance,188	and	would	be	likely	to	sell	out	their	holdings	in	return	for	a	premium.189	Indeed,	
the	possibility	of	hostile	takeovers	was	probably	one	of	the	main	reasons	why	 institutional	
investors	were	willing	and	able	to	remain	passive	throughout	the	period	from	the	1960s	to	
the	1980s.		
Whilst	all	these	factors	contributed	to	the	emergence	of	the	hostile	takeover	after	1948,	the	
contribution	of	s184	has	not	received	sufficient	attention.	Hannah	rejected	the	argument	that	
the	new	power	of	the	majority	to	remove	the	directors	facilitated	the	emergence	of	the	hostile	
takeover	on	the	basis	that	the	Stock	Exchange	already	required	listed	companies	to	have	a	
term	equivalent	 to	Art	80	of	Table	A	1929	 in	 their	articles.190	However,	 that	provision	only	
required	that	directors	be	removable	by	extraordinary	resolution,	that	is,	by	a	75%	majority.	
The	 dissenting	 minority	 of	 the	 Jenkins	 Committee,	 led	 by	 Gower,	 implicitly	 identified	 its	
importance,	noting	that,	following	the	introduction	of	s184,	‘the	ultimate	sanction	vested	in	
the	shareholders…	was	greatly	strengthened	by	enabling	them	to	dismiss	any	director	at	any	
time	by	majority	vote’,	and	that	‘the	possibility	that	a	take-over	bidder	will	obtain	control	by	
acquiring	 these	 votes	 has	 caused	 directors	 to	 pay	 greater	 heed	 to	 the	 interests	 of	
shareholders’.191	More	recent	commentary	has	begun	to	focus	on	the	significance	of	this	legal	
change.	 In	his	2008	historical	account	of	the	separation	of	ownership	and	control,	Cheffins	
noted	that	this	provision	of	the	Companies	Act	1948	‘imposed	constraints	on	those	controlling	
																																								 																				
188	The	Wilson	Report	concluded	that	the	extent	of	direct	contact	between	institutions	and	companies	
‘varies	greatly’	(see	Committee	to	Review	the	Functioning	of	Financial	Institutions	(Cmnd	7937,	1980),	
para	900).	In	1989,	in	a	Bank	of	England	discussion	paper,	Charkham	concluded	that	while	dialogue	
did	occur	‘on	occasion’,	most	shareholders	had	‘all	but	abdicated’	their	responsibilities	under	the	
system	of	‘shareholder	supremacy’.	J	Charkham,	‘Corporate	Governance	and	the	Market	for	
Companies:	Aspects	of	the	Shareholders’	Role’	Bank	of	England	Discussion	Paper	No	44,	November	
1989,	4.	
189	We	are	grateful	to	John	Quail	for	suggesting	this	point.	Franks	et	al	(2005,	above	n	55,	p	586)	
highlight	the	importance	of	‘the	growing	influence	of	institutional	investors…	in	establishing	the	
United	Kingdom’s	unusually	active	market	in	corporate	control’.	
190	Hannah	(1974)	above	n	131,	p	5	fn	69.	
191	Jenkins	Committee,	Note	of	Dissent,	(1962)	above	n	184,	paras	4	and	7.	
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companies’	and	‘increased	the	leverage	bidders	possessed’.192	Bruner	notes	that	the	new	rule	
‘permitted	 would-be	 acquirers	 to	 achieve	 substantial	 governance	 power	 through	 open-
market	share	purchases’.193	Moore	has	gone	the	furthest	in	recognising	the	importance	of	this	
right,	describing	the	shareholders’	 ‘shotgun	right’	as	the	‘most	significant	 legal-institutional	
factor	underlying	the	centrality	of	the	so-called	“shareholder	wealth-maximisation	norm”’.194	
By	changing	the	thresholds	for	control	of	the	board,	and	with	it,	the	management,	s184	played	
a	 critical	 role	 in	 allowing	 the	 hostile	 takeover	 to	 become	 an	 established	 practice,	 the	
legitimacy	 of	 which	 was	 no	 longer	 questioned	 by	 policy-makers	 after	 the	 mid-1950s.	 It	
gradually	gained	approval,	first	from	commentators,195	then	from	the	City	of	London	and	the	
Bank	of	England,196	and,	finally,	in	1962,	from	the	Jenkins	Company	Law	Review	Committee,	
which	 endorsed	 takeovers	 as	 a	 ‘convenient	 method	 of	 amalgamation’. 197 	The	 dissenting	
minority	of	that	Committee	added	the	further	gloss	that	takeovers	were	a	spur	to	managerial	
efficiency.198	By	 1963,	 the	 efficiency-enhancing	 effects	 of	 takeovers	 were	 beginning	 to	 be	
theorised	 by	 economists,199	and	 in	 1965,	Manne	 introduced	 the	 theory	 of	 the	market	 for	
																																								 																				
192	Cheffins	(2008)	above	n	7,	pp	76	and	363.	At	p	332,	Cheffins	notes	that	the	new	right	of	the	
majority	to	dismiss	directors	before	the	end	of	their	term	was	stricter	than	the	stock	exchange	
requirements.	
193	Bruner	(2013)	above	n	148,	p	147.	
194	Moore	(2013)	above	n	3,	p	212.	
195	In	1954,	The	Economist	argued	that	if	companies	have	financed	themselves	through	retained	
earnings,	but	those	‘resources	are	successfully	employed	to	yield	their	best	economic	return,	the	
companies	never	will	be	will	be,	or	need	not	be,	“victims”	at	all,	for	the	bidder	will	defeated.	But	if	the	
assets	are	not	yielding	a	proper	return,	then	even	the	bidder	who	“merely”	wishes	to	take	possession	
of	them	will	generally	be	performing	an	economic	service	to	the	community.’	(The	Economist,	23rd	
January	1954,	p254).	In	1961,	Bull	and	Vice	approved	of	the	argument	that	‘the	bidder	makes	the	
most	efficient	use	of	a	company’s	assets’,	whilst	‘many	boards	in	the	past	have	tended	to	adopt	
excessively	long-term	schedules’.	Bull	and	Vice	(1961)	above	n	175,	pp	25-6.	
196	In	1953,	the	Bank	of	England	had	expressed	opposition	to	the	emerging	hostile	takeover,	but	by	
1958	had	given	its	approval:	see	Roberts	(1992)	above	n	155,	pp	187	and	191.	
197	Jenkins	Committee	(1962)	above	n	184,	para	265.		
198	Ibid,	Note	of	Dissent,	para	9:	‘Efficient	directors	who	have	treated	their	shareholders	fairly	and	
frankly	should	have	little	to	fear	from	a	raider’	and	should	not	be	allowed	to	protect	themselves	
against	this	‘remote	risk’	by	issuing	non-voting	shares	and	‘converting	themselves	into	a	self-
perpetuating	oligarchy’.	
199	R	Marris,	‘A	Model	of	the	“Managerial”	Enterprise’	(1963)	77	Quarterly	Journal	of	Economics	185,	
190.	
43	
	
corporate	control	to	the	United	States.200	In	1968,	the	City	Code	on	Takeovers	and	Mergers	
was	 introduced,	 normalising	 the	 hostile	 takeover	 by	 precluding	 directors	 from	 taking	 any	
action	 to	 frustrate	 bids	 and	 removing	 the	 uncertainty	 that	 surrounded	 the	 common	 law	
approach	 to	 defensive	 measures. 201 	The	 autonomy	 of	 directors	 and	 managers	 had	 been	
truncated,	 and	 from	 then	 on,	 their	 primary	 focus	 was,	 of	 necessity,	 the	 interest	 of	
shareholders	as	expressed	by	the	share	price.	
	
6.	CONCLUSION	
In	 this	 article,	 we	 have	 argued	 that,	 during	 the	 first	 half	 of	 the	 century,	 companies	 were	
moving	towards	an	enterprise	model,	with	professional	managers	balancing	the	competing	
interests	of	the	various	groups	and	fostering	innovation	in	pursuit	of	the	public	good.	In	this	
new	enterprise,	the	shareholders	had	become	peripheral	and	passive,	temporary	holders	of	
claims	on	the	company,	whilst	hierarchies	of	directors	and	managers	were	virtually	permanent,	
protected	 by	 the	 company’s	 articles,	 their	 own	 shareholdings	 and	 the	 courts’	 refusal	 to	
interfere	 in	 the	way	 companies	were	 run.	 In	other	words,	 this	 evolution	of	 the	enterprise	
occurred	within	the	existing	 legal	context.	Company	law	granted	great	 leeway	to	directors,	
allowing	 them	 to	 nominate	 managers	 to	 run	 the	 company	 in	 their	 place,	 subject	 only	 to	
residual	control.	However,	the	role	of	management	was	never	really	considered	by	the	law,	
and	managers	were	never	given	legal	guarantees	of	the	autonomy	which	was	required	if	they	
were	to	fulfil	the	functions	claimed	for	them	in	the	burgeoning	management	literature.		
The	 1948	 reforms	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 a	 reduction	 of	 the	 fragile	 autonomy	 of	
management,	and	with	it,	the	potential	of	the	enterprise	to	balance	competing	interests	and	
																																								 																				
200	HG	Manne,	‘Mergers	and	the	Market	for	Corporate	Control’	(1965)	73	Journal	of	Political	Economy	
110.	
201	Johnston	(2008)	above	n	181.	
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to	 innovate.	 They	 disrupted	 these	 hierarchical	 structures	 (to	 which	 the	 shareholders	 had	
impliedly	consented)	with	the	introduction	of	a	mandatory	statutory	rule	(highly	unusual	in	
the	 company	 law	context)	which	allowed	 the	 removal	of	 the	directors	by	 simple	majority,	
overriding	anything	in	the	company’s	articles.	This	article	has	shown	that	shareholder	control	
represents	a	regulatory	and	policy	choice	rather	than	a	market	outcome.	This	choice	was	little	
debated	 in	 Parliament,	 and	 its	 instigators	 fell	 back	 on	 unjustified	 assumptions	 that	
shareholder	control	was	essential.	Efficiency-based	justifications	of	company	law	only	came	
later,	 attempting,	 as	 Ireland	 puts	 it,	 ‘to	 defend	 and	 legitimate	 the	 rights	 and	 privileges	 of	
rentier	shareholders’.202	
This	article	has	begun	the	task	of	showing	what	was	lost	in	this	change.	Companies	became	
single	purpose,	financial	entities,	having	control	over,	but	providing	little	positive	support	for,	
the	business	enterprise.	The	capacity	of	management	to	take	account	of	the	impacts	of	their	
decisions	on	a	range	of	 interests	was	greatly	reduced	as	they	were	forced	by	the	threat	of	
takeover	to	prioritise	the	immediate	financial	interests	of	shareholders.	This	‘bracketing’203	of	
company	 law	 in	 the	 name	 of	 greater	 director	 accountability	 to	 shareholders	 produced	 a	
number	of	adverse	side-effects	in	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	including	short-
termism	and	a	lack	of	investment	in	R&D	and	innovation,	side-effects	which	continue	to	the	
present	day.	Yet	there	is	little	or	no	appetite	for	fundamental	reform	to	the	scope	of	company	
law.	Policy-makers	are	discussing	restoring	trust	in	companies	through	indirect	measures	such	
as	 country-by-country	 tax	 reporting,	 or	 through	 stakeholder	 advisory	 panels.	 We	 would	
suggest	that	more	fruitful	avenues	may	be	found	by	revisiting	the	management	literature	of	
the	first	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	and	finding	new	ways	to	guarantee	autonomy	within	a	
framework	of	accountability.		
																																								 																				
202	P	Ireland,	‘Defending	the	Rentier:	Corporate	Theory	and	Reprivatization	of	the	Public	Company’	in	
A	Gamble,	G	Kelly	and	J	Parkinson	(eds)	The	Political	Economy	of	the	Company	(Oxford:	Hart,	2001)	pp	
144-5	
203	L	Johnson,	‘New	Approaches	to	Corporate	Law’	(1993)	50	Wash.	&	Lee.	L.	Rev.	1713,	1715.	
